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EVERY DAY COUNTS: PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE
IDEA’S DUE PROCESS STRUCTURE
Elizabeth A. Shaver *
Abstract
It is a core principle of special education legislation that the parents
of children with disabilities can challenge the child’s educational
programming through an administrative due process hearing. Yet, for
years the special education due process structure has been criticized as
inefficient, anti-collaborative, and prohibitively expensive. Those criticisms
have given rise to widely varying proposals to reform special education due
process, proposals that range from adding certain alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms to a wholesale replacement of the due process
structure.
This article provides a comprehensive analysis of special education
dispute resolution. The article first examines the lively debate among
scholars and special interest groups about perceived deficiencies of IDEA
due process and various proposals to remedy those deficiencies. The
article then sets forth the results of a nationwide survey in which over three
hundred and fifty special education attorneys voiced their opinions about
the current structure and some proposals for reform. Finally, the article
recommends certain structural changes to IDEA due process that are
designed to improve the efficiency and reduce the cost of special education
dispute resolution.

INTRODUCTION
The ability of parents to challenge the educational programming of a
child with a disability is crucial, since every day that a child does not
receive an appropriate education is a day of learning that is lost forever. For
this reason, it has long been a fixture of special education law that parents
are entitled to a due process hearing in which they can advocate for the
needs of their child. 1
*

Assistant Professor of Legal Writing, The University of Akron School of Law; J.D.
The Cornell Law School; B.A. Vanderbilt University. I would like to thank Sarah Morath,
Mark Weber and Phil Carino for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. I extend
special thanks to Daniel Glass for his invaluable work on this article.
1
See, e.g., Penna Ass’n. of Retarded Citizens v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.
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A special education dispute should be resolved quickly to ensure
that the child receives appropriate educational services at the earliest
possible date. 2 An equally important goal is that special education due
process is accessible to all children with disabilities regardless of family
wealth. Yet critics argue that special education due process currently does
not serve these goals, either because of the lack of “collaborative and nonadversarial” 3 means for families and school districts to resolve disputes
quickly or the prohibitive costs associated with due process. 4
In 2004, when Congress last amended the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Congress found that parents and school
districts needed “expanded opportunities to resolve their disagreements in
positive and constructive ways.” 5 To accomplish this goal, Congress added
or expanded alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms that are
triggered once a due process complaint is filed. IDEA now requires the
parties to attend a “resolution session” that must take place within 15 days
after a due process complaint is filed, unless both parties agree to waive the
session. 6 IDEA also provides expanded opportunities to mediate a special
education dispute. 7 Both the resolution session and mediation can delay an
adjudicated resolution of the dispute. 8
Advocacy organizations and scholars contend that, even with these
dispute resolution mechanisms in place, special education dispute resolution
still is too expensive and time-consuming. School administrators assert that
the litigation costs are so high that school districts often agree to provide
services not required by IDEA. 9 Advocates for children and parents
contend that due process is too expensive for most parents, who cannot
afford to pay the attorneys and expert witnesses whose participation is

Pa. 1972) [hereinafter PARC]; Mills v. Bd. of Ed. of Dist. of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866,
874-76 (D.D.C. 1972) [hereinafter Mills]; 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1415 (2012).
2
A special education dispute should be resolved through an administrative due process
hearing in no more than seventy-five days. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b) (2007) (setting 30day period for resolution session); 34 C.F.R. § 300.515 (2007) (setting 45-day timeline
hearing officer to render a decision).
3
Philip Moses & Timothy Heeden, Collaborating for Our Children’s Future:
Mediating Special Education Disputes, 18 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 4, 5 (Summer 2012).
4
Part II., infra.
5
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(8) (2012).
6
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B) (2012).
7
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2012).
8
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(c)(3) (2012).
9
Sasha Pudelski, Rethinking Special Education Due Process, AM. ASS’N OF SCH.
ADM’RS,
2
(April
2013),
http://www.aasa.org/uploadedFiles/Policy_and_Advocacy/Public_Policy_Resources/Speci
al_Education/AASARethinkingSpecialEdDueProcess.pdf.
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essential in a due process hearing. 10
The continued debate over the structure of IDEA due process has
yielded widely-varying proposals for reform. Some advocates propose that
IDEA should include ADR mechanisms in addition to the resolution session
and mediation. 11 Others propose increased governmental enforcement of
IDEA’s provisions or expanded low-cost or pro bono legal services for
lower income parents. 12 At least one special interest group, the American
Association of School Administrators (AASA), has proposed a radical
overhaul of due process procedures in which the parties must engage in
several mandatory procedures before litigation can be filed. 13 Still others
propose that the due process structure essentially remain the same, with
only modest reforms designed to increase efficiency and reduce cost. 14
This article explores the merits of these various proposals to reform
special education dispute resolution. As part of this exploration, the article
includes the results of a survey that asked special education attorneys about
the current structure and certain proposals to modify the structure. Finally,
the article recommends certain structural changes designed to reduce the
expense and time needed to resolve a special education dispute.
Part I of the article provides historical background on special
education due process and a description of IDEA’s current due process
procedures. Part II of the article describes the ongoing debate about the
efficacy and accessibility of due process and the various proposals for
change. Part III of the article describes the results of a nationwide survey of
special education practitioners regarding the current structure and some of
the proposals for change. Part IV of the article recommends certain
structural changes to due process procedures.
At the end of the day, regardless whether the parties use ADR
mechanisms to settle a dispute or adjudicate the dispute in a due process
hearing, the ultimate goal is to resolve special education disputes quickly
and efficiently so that the child’s education does not suffer. The IDEA
10

Elisa Hyman, et. al., How IDEA Fails Families without Means: Causes and
Corrections From the Frontlines of Special Education Lawyering, 20 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC.
& POL’Y & L. 107, 112-13 (2011).
11
Tracy C. Mueller, IEP Facilitation: A Promising Approach to Resolving Conflicts
Between Parents and Families, 41 TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 60 (Jan/Feb. 2009)
(discussing IEP facilitation); S, James Rosenfeld, It’s Time for an Alternative Dispute
Resolution Process, 21 J. NAT’L. ASS’N. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 544 (2012) (proposing that
IDEA include a process for voluntary, binding arbitration).
12
See Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty and The Limits of Private
Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1430-33 (2011).
13
Pudelski, supra note 9.
14
Mark C. Weber, In Defense of IDEA Due Process, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
495 (2014).
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procedures should ensure that, for the child, every day of school counts.
I.

IDEA’S DUE PROCESS PROCEDURES.

A. Early Origins of Special Education Due Process.
Before 1975, federal law did not provide children with disabilities in
the United States with the right to attend public school, although some
states did provide special education services. 15 In the early 1970s,
advocates for children with disabilities won two key cases 16 by drawing
heavily from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education, 17 in which the Court ruled that racially-segregated education
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
two landmark cases, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children
(PARC) v. Pennsylvania 18 and Mills v. Board of Education of the District of
Columbia, 19 established, among other rights, that parents of a child with a
disability would be entitled to “notice” and “an opportunity to be heard”
whenever educators made decisions about educational services for the child.
Robust due process rights were a key focus of both the PARC and
Mills cases because then-existing state statutes and school policies allowed
school districts to exclude from public school any child deemed
“uneducable,” without any notice to or input from the child’s parents. 20 In
the PARC case, the parties executed a Consent Agreement that set forth
very detailed due process provisions. Parents were entitled to receive
written notice whenever a school district proposed to initiate or change
special education services. 21 The Consent Agreement provided that the
notice would:
•

15

“[D]escribe the proposed action in detail,” including, among other
things, a “statement of the reasons” for the proposed action and
information about any “tests or reports” upon which the proposed
action was based; 22

Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act: A
Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349, 355 (1990).
16
PARC, 343 F. Supp. 279; Mills, 348 F. Supp. 866.
17
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18
343 F. Supp. 279.
19
348 F. Supp. 866.
20
See, e.g., PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 282 n.3 (quoting Pennsylvania statutes that
permitted a school district to exclude a child from school if a school psychologist
determined that the child was “uneducable or untrainable”).
21
Id. at 303-05.
22
Id. at 304.
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•

Inform parents of their right to a hearing before any proposed action
would take place; 23

•

Inform parents of their rights (a) to have counsel (or any other
person) at the hearing, (b) to review the child’s school records,
including any tests or reports upon which the proposed action was
based, (c) to present any evidence at the hearing, including expert
medical, psychological and educational testimony, and (d) to call as
a witness any school official, employee, or agent of a school
district; 24 and

•

Inform parents of the procedures by which they could pursue a
hearing, among other items. 25

The PARC Consent Agreement further specified how the hearing was to
be conducted. 26 The hearing was to be scheduled between fifteen and thirty
days after receipt of the parents’ request for a hearing. 27 The hearing officer
was to be “the Secretary of Education,” or a person designated by the
Secretary, but could not be “an officer, employee or agent” of the school
district. 28 The hearing officer’s decision was to be based “solely upon the
evidence presented” and the hearing officer must have found that the
proposed change was supported by “substantial evidence” presented at the
hearing. 29 The parents had a right to be represented at the hearing and to
present any evidence or testimony, including expert medical, psychological
or educational testimony. 30 The hearing officer was to render a decision
within twenty days after the hearing, and the decision was to contain
“written findings of fact and conclusions of law. 31 The parents were
entitled to a transcript of the hearing record. 32 Importantly, the child’s
educational status could not change during the notice and hearing process,
except in “extraordinary circumstances” after written notice to and approval
by a representative of the state board of education. 33

23

Id.
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 304-05.
27
Id. at 305.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
24
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B. Congress Enacts Special Education Legislation.
In 1975, Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act (EAHCA), which provided federal funding for special education
services. 34 The EAHCA conditioned the States’ receipt of federal funding
upon compliance with the statute’s requirement that each child with a
disability receive a “free appropriate public education,” or FAPE. 35
Through the EAHCA, Congress leveraged its Spending Clause powers to
essentially require all States to provide special education services to
children with disabilitiesb. 36
The EAHCA represented the culmination of several years of federal
legislative activity in the field of special education. Congress first provided
federal funds for states to develop special education programs as early as
1965, when Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
(ESEA). 37 In 1966, Congress added Title VI to the ESEA, entitled
“Education of the Handicapped Children.” 38 Among other things, thenTitle VI established a Bureau for the Education of the Handicapped and a
National Advisory Committee on Handicapped Children. 39 In 1970,
Congress enacted the Education of the Handicapped Act, 40 which
consolidated prior federal legislation regarding special education initiatives
into one piece of legislation. 41
In 1974, after the PARC and Mills cases were decided, Congress
amended the Education of the Handicapped Act to provide due process
rights to parents of children with disabilities. 42 In considering those
amendments, Congress reviewed the PARC and Mills decisions as well as
reports and scholarly articles on the topic of due process. 43 The due process
34

Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2012).
36
20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2012) (setting for the requirement that States draft and implement
policies and procedures in order to qualify for federal funds).
37
Pub. L. No. 89-10, Section 503(a)(10), 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
38
Pub L. No. 89-750, 80 Stat. 1191, 1204 (1966); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC, TWENTYSECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDEA, at vi.
(2000) (http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/2000/preface.pdf).
39
Id.
40
Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (1970).
41
Weber, supra note 15, at 357 (describing early federal legislative efforts).
42
Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484 (1974).
43
In March 1973, the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate’s Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare held hearings in which a large number of printed materials
were reviewed, including the PARC and Mills decisions, a report entitled “A Continuing
Summary of Pending and Completed Litigation Regarding the Education of Handicapped
35
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provisions of the 1974 Education of the Handicapped Act, while not terribly
detailed, 44 borrowed heavily from the due process procedures outlined in
the PARC and Mills cases. 45 Yet the legislative history reveals no
discussion by Congress as to whether those due process procedures were the
optimal means to resolve special education disputes. 46
One year later, Congress amended the Education of the Handicapped
Act and created comprehensive special education legislation known as the
EAHCA. 47 In the EAHCA, Congress created a statutory section entitled
“Procedural Safeguards” with very detailed due process procedures. 48 Once
again, Congress drew heavily from the due process requirements of the
PARC and Mills decisions. 49
For example, the EAHCA required the school district to provide written
notice to the parents 50 whenever the district either proposed or refused to
“initiate or change … the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate public
education to the child.” 51 If necessary, that notice would have to be in the
parents’ native language. 52 The statute also specified that parents be
afforded the opportunity file a complaint and an opportunity for an impartial
due process hearing to be conducted either by the school district (labelled
the “local educational agency” in the statute) or the state educational
Children” edited by the Council for Exceptional Children, and a Syracuse University law
review article entitled “Appropriate Education for All Handicapped Children: A Growing
Issue” authored by Frederick Weintraub and Alan Abelson. See Education for the
Handicapped, 1973: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Handicapped of the S. Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 93rd Cong. vii, 39, 155 (1973) (hereinafter “1973 Hearing”).
44
Pub. L. No. 93-380, §613(A), 88 Stat. 484, 582 (1974).
45
A 1975 Senate Report stated that the 1974 Amendments “incorporated the major
principles of the right to education cases.” See S. Rep. No. 94-168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432 (1975).
46
The Senate Conference Report that accompanies the 1974 Amendments to the
Education of the Handicapped Act only obliquely refers to the due process procedures,
noting that the amendments “require[] States to provide procedures for insuring that
safeguards in decisions regarding identification, evaluation, and educational placement of
handicapped children.” See S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1026, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4206, 4257 (1974).
47
Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
48
Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
49
Robert T. Stafford, Education for the Handicapped: A Senator’s Perspective, 3 VT.
L. REV. 71, 76 (1978) (noting that the EAHCA “codified rights already spelled out in
earlier court decisions”). Senator Stafford served on the Senate Subcommittee on the
Handicapped. See 1973 Hearing, supra note 43, at ii.
50
A “parent” under both the EAHCA and the current IDEA is defined to mean more
than just the child’s biological parents. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(23) (2012).
51
Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(b)(1)(C)(ii), 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
52
Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(b)(1)(D), 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
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agency. 53
As to the manner in which the hearing would be conducted, the statute
provided that any party had the right (a) “to be accompanied and advised by
counsel and by individuals with special knowledge or training with respect
to the problems of handicapped children,” 54 (b) to “present evidence,” 55 (c)
to compel the attendance of witnesses who could be subject to crossexamination, 56 (d) to a “written or electronic verbatim record” 57 of the
hearing, and (e) to receive “written findings of fact and decisions.” 58
The EACHCA gave the States some discretion in designing a due
process structure. The statute allowed each State to determine individually
whether the impartial due process hearing would be held at the local level or
the state agency level. 59 If the hearing was conducted at the local level, the
State could choose to have the parties file an appeal with the state
educational agency, a proceeding in which a state agency-appointed review
officer would make an “independent decision” on the matter after an
impartial review of the hearing. 60 Thereafter either party could file suit in
either state or federal court. 61 Alternatively, the State could choose not to
require a state-level administrative appeal before either party could file suit
in state or federal court.
These two alternative structures are known as “one-tier” and “two-tier”
structures. 62 In a two-tier system, the impartial due process hearing is
conducted at the local level, and the appeal of a hearing officer’s decision is
filed with the state educational agency before a party can file suit in court. 63
In a one-tier system, following a hearing officer’s decision, a party may file
suit directly in federal or state court. 64
This ability to select either a one-tier or a two-tier system still exists in
IDEA today. 65 However, in the last twenty years, the states increasingly
have adopted a one-tier system. 66 Currently 42 states and the District of
53

Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(b)(1)(E), 89 Stat. 773 (1975); Pub. L. No. 94-142,
§615(b)(2), 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
54
Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(d)(1), 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
55
Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(d)(2), 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
56
Id.
57
Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(d)(3), 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
58
Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(d)(4), 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
59
Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(c), 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
60
Id.
61
Pub. L. No. 94-142, §615(e)(2), 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
62
Perry A. Zirkel, et. al., Due Process Hearings under the IDEA: A State-by-State
Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3, 4 (2010).
63
See e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-51-05(K)(14) (West 2014).
64
See e.g., 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 301-8:2220-R-6.02 (West 2014).
65
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (2012); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2012).
66
Zirkel,, supra note 62, at 4.
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Columbia have a one-tier system. 67
The due process structure that was first enacted in the EAHCA and is
still in effect today depends almost entirely upon private enforcement of
children’s rights by their parents. 68 In almost every instance, a child’s
parent(s) are responsible to advocate for the child at the administrative level
and, if necessary, in state or federal court. 69
C. The 1990 and 1997 Amendments to IDEA.
In 1990, when Congress amended and re-authorized the EAHCA, it
re-named the statute the Individual with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA). 70 The IDEA was again reauthorized and amended in both 1997
and 2004. 71
Before the 1997 amendments, IDEA did not provide for any form of
ADR, although mediation had been suggested as early as 1976, when the
Commissioner of Education issued the implementing regulations for the
EAHCA. 72 In addition, the 1990 Amendments had authorized the Secretary
67

Id. at 5; 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 301-8:2220-R-6.02 (West 2014) (Colorado moved
from a two-tier structure to a one-tier structure beginning in 2011).
68
Senate Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1975, 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1138
(1975) (the goal of the EAHCA was to “provide and reinforce procedural protections for
parents and children.”).
69
IDEA does provide for a “state complaint procedure” that allows any individual or
organization to file a complaint with a state educational agency regarding an alleged
violation of IDEA by a local educational agency. See 34 C.F.R. §§300.151, 300.153
(2012). State complaints can involve allegations regarding the services provided to an
individual child or a systematic, generalized violation of IDEA. Such a complaint is filed
with the state educational agency, which conducts an investigation and issues a decision.
See Ruth Colker, Special Education Complaint Resolution: Ohio, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 371, 371-73 (2014) (describing state complaint procedures). While the state
complaint procedure is an inexpensive means to seek resolution of a special education
dispute, it has significant limitations, including a one-year statute of limitations, the lack of
any hearing or other means to assess credibility of witnesses, and limitations on the type of
relief that can be ordered. Id. In addition, parents do not control the progress of the
investigation as they do when a due process complaint is filed.
70
Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103, 1142 (1990).
71
Individuals with Disabilities Amendment Act for 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111
Stat. 37; Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-446, 118 Stat. 2467.
72
In issuing regulations relating to procedural safeguards under the EAHCA, the
Commissioner of Education included a comment, which stated as follows:
Many States have pointed to the success of using mediation as an intervening
step prior to conducting a formal due process hearing. Although the process
of mediation is not required by the statute or these regulations, an agency
may wish to suggest mediation in disputes concerning the identification,
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of Education to make grants to explore the resolution of special education
disputes “in a timely manner through dispute mediation and other
methods.” 73
In 1997, Congress amended IDEA to require the States to offer
mediation to the parties in a special education dispute. 74 Mediation was
required to be voluntary. 75 It could not be used to delay or deny the right to
a due process hearing. 76 The mediation was to be confidential, and nothing
that occurred in mediation could be used as evidence in a subsequent due
process or court proceeding. 77 The mediation had to be conducted by a
“qualified and impartial mediator trained in effective mediation
techniques.” 78 The cost of mediation was to be borne by the State. 79
In enacting these provisions, Congress stated its preference that special
education disputes be resolved both quickly and amicably. The Report of
the Senate’s Committee on Labor and Human Resources stated the
“committee’s strong preference that mediation become the norm for
resolving disputes under IDEA.” 80 Mediation was seen as an attractive
method to resolve disputes “amicably” and with “the child’s best interests in
mind.” 81 Another goal of the mediation option was to reduce the cost
associated with due process. 82
The 1997 Amendments strongly encouraged parents to use mediation as
evaluation, and educational placement of handicapped children, and the
provision of a free appropriate public education to those children.
Mediations have been conducted by members of State educational agencies
or local educational agency personnel who were not previously involved in
the particular case. In many cases, mediation leads to resolution of
difference between parents and agencies without the development of an
adversarial relationship and with minimal emotional stress. However,
mediation may not be used to deny or delay a parent’s rights under [Subpart
E of the EAHCA].
42 Fed. Reg. 42474, 42495 (Aug. 23, 1977).
73
Pub. Law 101–476, 104 Stat 1103 (1990) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §1441).
74
Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §1415(e)).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
S. Rep. No. 105-17, at 26 (1997).
81
Id.
82
See S. Rep. No. 104-275, at 18 (1996). At the time, 31 States had already developed
mediation processes to resolve special education disputes. Id. Congress also contemplated
whether attorneys should be excluded from mediation proceedings, although Congress
ultimately left that decision up to the States. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-614, at 16 (1996)
(discussion attorney presence in mediation).
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a means to resolve disputes. Any written notice to parents from a school
district regarding proposed changes (or the refusal to make changes) with
regard to special education services had to include information about the
availability of mediation. 83 If the parents declined to engage in mediation,
either the school district or the state educational agency could establish
procedures that would require the parents to meet with someone from a
“community parent resource center” or similar entity who would
“encourage the use, and explain the benefits, of the mediation process.” 84
At the time of the 1997 Amendments, Congress did hear testimony from
those who advocated for mandatory mediation as a prerequisite to any due
process proceedings. 85 However, Congress did not go so far as to require
mediation before a due process complaint could be filed.
Following the 1997 Amendments, the Department of Education’s Office
of Special Education Programs (OSEP), began to fund a technical assistance
center focused on exploring special education dispute resolution. 86 The
Center for Appropriate Dispute Resolution in Special Education (CADRE)
is an invaluable resource for statistics and other information about special
education dispute resolution. 87 CADRE has sponsored or authored a
number of reports regarding the use of ADR mechanisms to resolve special
education disputes. 88 CADRE also has collected information about various
state dispute resolution systems and has highlighted the systems in four
states – Wisconsin, Iowa, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania – as “exemplary”
83

Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (later codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)).
Pub. L. No. 105-17, Section 615 (e)(2)(B)(ii), 111 Stat. 37 (1997). This provision of
IDEA was later described as “a section … that essentially allows a school to punish a
parent who doesn’t want to go to mediation by forcing them to talk to somebody about all
the wonders of mediation.” Special Education: Is IDEA Working as Congress Intended?:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 107th Cong. 118-119 (2001)
(remarks of Kevin McDowell, general counsel, from the Indiana Department of Education).
That requirement was characterized as both “punitive” and “off-putting.” Id. IDEA’s
current provisions allow the local school district or state educational agency only to “offer”
parents the opportunity to meet with someone who will explain the benefits of mediation.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(B) (2012).
85
The IDEA Improvement Act of 1997: Hearings on H.R. 5 Before the Subcomm. on
Early Childhood, Youth, and Families of the H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce,
105th Cong. 224 (1997), (statement of Lillian M. Brinkley, on behalf of the National
Association of Elementary School Privileges, requesting statutory language that would
“require mediation before court action could be initiated ….”).
86
See 73 Fed. Reg. 44235, 44236 (July 30, 2008) (noting that OSEP has funded
CADRE since 1998).
87
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre.
88
See, e.g. CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., Trends in
Dispute Resolution Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),
(December
2013),
available
at
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Trends_DR_IDEA_DEC2013.pdf.
84
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systems. 89 In CADRE’s view, the qualities of these exemplary systems are
“high levels of stakeholder involvement, investment in early upstream
dispute resolution processes, use of technical and content expertise, active
participation in the CADRE Dispute Resolution Community of Practice,
engagement in continuous quality improvement practices and thorough
documentation of systems.” 90
CADRE’s website provides detailed
information about these systems. 91
D. The Current Due Process Provisions of IDEA.
Congress’s last amendments of IDEA took place in 2004. At that time,
Congress found that parents and school districts needed “expanded
opportunities to resolve their disagreements in positive and constructive
ways.” 92 To accomplish this goal, Congress added or expanded several
ADR mechanisms.
IDEA now requires the parties to attend a “resolution session” that must
take place within 15 days after a due process complaint is filed, unless both
parties agree to waive the session or to go to mediation. 93 The legislative
history indicates Congress’s intent that one of the main goals of the
resolution session is to “improve communication between parents and
school officials” when there is a dispute about services for a child with a
disability. 94
Attendance at the resolution session is mandatory unless the session is
waived. 95 Attorneys may not be present for either side unless the parent is
represented by an attorney; in other words, the school district’s attorney
cannot attend unless the parent also has legal representation. 96 Resolution
sessions are not confidential and no impartial mediator or facilitator must be
present. 97 If the parties reach an agreement during a resolution session, the
89

CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., Exemplar State
(last
visited
Jan.
22,
2015),
Profiles,
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/exemplar/exemplarprofiles.cfm.
90
Id.
91
CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., Four Exemplary
Dispute Resolution Systems in Special Education (June 2010), available at
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Combined%20State%20Profiles.pdf.
92
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(8) (2012).
93
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(b) (2012); see also Mark C. Weber, “Settling Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act Cases: Making Up is Hard to Do.” 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
641, 647-51 (2010) (describing the resolution session requirements).
94
See H.R. Rep. 108-77 at 114 (2003).
95
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(IV) (2012).
96
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(III) (2012).
97
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B); Andrea Blau, Available Dispute Resolution Processes
within the Reauthorized Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA)
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parties “shall execute a legally binding agreement,” 98 but either party can
void the agreement within three business days after it has been signed. 99
In addition to the resolution session, the 2004 Amendments made
mediation an option that the parties could use even before a due process
complaint was filed. 100 Both the resolution session and mediation extend
the timeline for any administrative hearing to take place, thus delaying an
adjudicated resolution of the dispute. 101
The 2004 Amendments were quite modest in terms of altering the
structure of due process. Indeed, the amendments were exceedingly modest
when one considers the variety of proposals put forth by legislators,
scholars and experts in the field in the early 2000s.
Beginning in 2001, both the executive and the legislative branches
undertook extensive reviews of special education due process. In October
2001, President George W. Bush created a Presidential Commission on
Excellence in Special Education, which was assigned to review special
education practices nationwide. 102 In July 2002, the Commission published
a report entitled “A New Era: Revitalizing Special Education for Children
and their Families.” 103 On the topic of dispute resolution, the Commission
described numerous complaints from parents, teachers and school
administrators about an “excessive focus on due process hearings and
litigation over special education disputes.” 104 The Commission concluded
that IDEA dispute resolution warranted “serious reform.” 105
One of the Commission’s recommendations was to add voluntary
binding arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. 106 While the
Commission’s report did not provide details regarding arbitration, it did
quote the testimony of Professor S. James Rosenfeld, who testified that
voluntary binding arbitration could be a “fair, impartial and fast” resolution
of a special education dispute. 107 In 2012, Professor Rosenfeld published an
article in which he set forth some specific proposal for voluntary, binding
arbitration, and that proposal is discussed in more detail below. 108
of 2004: Where Do Mediation Principles Fit In?, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 65, 73 (2007).
98
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii) (2012).
99
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iv) (2012).
100
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2012).
101
20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(1)(B)(ii) (2012); 34 C.F.R. §300.510(c)(3) (2012).
102
Executive Order 13227, 66 Fed. Reg. 51287 (Oct. 2, 2001).
103
“A New Era: Revitalizing Special Education for Children and their Families,.”
(hereinafter
“A
New
Era”),
available
at
http://www.nectac.org/~pdfs/calls/2010/earlypartc/revitalizing_special_education.pdf.
104
A New Era, supra note 103, at 40.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 40-41.
107
Id. at 41.
108
See Part II.C.2., infra.
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The Commission also recommended the use of early dispute resolution
processes such as “expert IEP facilitation,” 109 regarding that proposal. In
the early 2000s, IEP facilitation was a relatively new dispute resolution
process, and programs for IEP facilitation are discussed in more detail
below. 110 Both voluntary, binding arbitration and IEP facilitation were
discussed in hearings before Congressional committees charged with
amending IDEA. 111
In March 2003, a bill was introduced into the House of Representatives
that would have amended the due process provisions in several substantive
ways. 112 First, H.R. 1350 would have required the States to design a
procedure for the parties to voluntarily agree to arbitrate their dispute before
a single “arbitrator.” 113 Arbitration would have been an available dispute
resolution option after a due process complaint had been filed. The decision
of the arbitrator would have been a final resolution of the dispute “in lieu of
a due process hearing” with no opportunity for further review or appeal. 114
H.R. 1350 also mentioned the use of “individualized educational program
facilitators,” 115 although no details were given.
Second, H.R. 1350 would have amended IDEA to eliminate the two-tier
due process structure. 116 Specifically, H.R. 1350 provided that the party
who filed a due process complaint would have the opportunity “for an
impartial due process hearing, which [would] be conducted by the State
educational agency” only, with a right to appeal to state or federal court
after the SEA decision. 117
109

A New Era, supra note 103, at 40.
See Part II.C.1, infra.
111
IDEA: What’s Good for Kids? What Works for Schools?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. 65 (2002) (referring to
“informal problem resolution” and “binding arbitration” as means to resolve disputes):
IDEA: Focusing on Improvising Results for Children with Disabilities: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Education Reform of the H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 108th
Cong. 23 (2003) (discussing required mediation and binding arbitration); The President’s
Commission on Excellence in Special Education: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. 23, 34 (2002) (discussing voluntary binding
arbitration).
112
See H.R. 1350, 108th Cong.,2nd Sess. (2003), (introduced in the House), See also
H.R. Rep. No. 108-77, at 113-14 (2003); Statements of John Boehner, 149 Cong. Rec.
H3458-01, (Apr. 30, 2003) (discussing voluntary binding arbitration as a means to resolve
special education disputes).
113
H.R. 1350 §205(e).
114
Id. The bill specified that arbitration decision would not be final in the event of
fraud or misconduct. Id.
115
Id. at §672(a)(4).
116
Id. at §205(f) (proposing to amend 20 U.S.C. 1415(f)(1)(A)).
117
Id. at §205(f) and 205(g); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. 108-779 at 217 (2004) (noting
that the House Bill “does not provide for a State-level appeal system, so eliminates the
110
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Also in March 2003, Senator Rick Santorum introduced a bill entitled
the “Teacher Paperwork Reduction Act,” which would have required,
among other things, mandatory mediation of special education disputes
under IDEA. 118 Senate Bill 626 set forth certain proposed findings of
Congress, including the finding that, among the causes of “burdensome
paperwork” 119 for special education teachers was the “litigation and the
threat of litigation.” 120 Another proposed finding was that mediation of
special education disputes resolved disputes more quickly, cost less, and
generally led to satisfactory results. 121 The bill proposed to amend IDEA to
make mediation a mandatory process in any special education dispute. 122
In the end, the 2004 Amendments did not include voluntary binding
arbitration, IEP facilitation, or mandatory mediation. The Amendments
also did not eliminate the two-tier due process structure. The only
substantive changes were the addition of the resolution session 123 and
allowing mediation take place at any time. 124

II.

THE DEBATE CONTINUES.

A. Current Criticisms of IDEA Due Process.
Even with the addition of the resolution session and expanded
opportunities for mediation, advocates for both families and school districts
contend that due process still is expensive, time-consuming, and
counterproductive to a collaborative parent-school relationship. These three
points of contention have given rise to a number of additional proposals to
“reform” special education due process, as described in Part II.C. below.
The litigation cost is a point of contention on both sides of the table.
School administrators assert that litigating a special education dispute is so
expensive that school districts often agree to provide services that are not

dual-tier language.”).
118
S.
626,
108th
Cong.,
1st
Sess.
(2003),
available
at
https://www.congress.gov/108/bills/s626/BILLS-108s626is.pdf. A bill entitled the “IDEA
Paperwork Reduction Act of 2003” was introduced into the House of Representatives in
January 2003, but that bill did not contain any provisions to amend the dispute resolution
processes of IDEA. See H.R. 464, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003).
119
S. 626, §2(8).
120
S. 626, §2(8)(C).
121
S. 626, §2(9).
122
S. 626, §5.
123
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B).
124
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e).
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required by IDEA 125 These advocates also contend that, when school
districts provide unnecessary services to one child to avoid litigation costs,
other children with disabilities suffer. The argument is that, due to limited
school budgets, the children who receive unnecessary services as a result of
school district capitulation take those services away from other children in
need. 126
While this argument has a certain facial appeal, some scholars challenge
the twin assumptions underlying this argument, specifically that parents
who file a due process complaint always want expensive services, and that
special education funding is a “fixed pot of educational goods” 127 such that
a service provided to one child means less service for another child. 128
Indeed, there are many inexpensive disputes that could give rise to a special
education dispute, including a parent’s desire to have the child educated in a
less restrictive, less expensive environment 129 or a dispute about whether a
child’s violation of the school code of conduct was a manifestation of the
child’s disability. 130
Moreover, rather than dealing with a limited, inflexible budget, school
districts have many ways of managing the costs of special education
services, including litigation costs. School districts have the ability to
purchase insurance for special education litigation at attractive rates. 131
School districts also can access state funding for special education services
from state education agencies, many of whom have established state risk

125

Pudelski, supra note 9, at 2.
Id. at 8.
127
Weber, supra note 14, at 505.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
IDEA requires that, if necessary, a school district bear the cost of a child’s
placement in a private school or residential facility. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(10)(B) (2012).
Some critics assume parents who file due process are seeking these expensive placements.
See, e.g., Pudelski, supra note 9, at 8, n.19. In evaluating this argument, one should
consider that, as of 2010, just 3.4% of the nation’s 6.4 million children receiving special
education services were placed in the “expensive” settings such as a separate school for
children with disabilities or a residential facility. See Thomas D. Snyder, et. al., U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2014-015, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2012, at 89 tbl. 48
(2013), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014015.pdf [hereinafter DIGEST OF
EDUCATION STATISTICS 2012] (number of children with disabilities receiving services
under IDEA); DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, at 91 tbl. 50 (placement of children
receiving services under IDEA). In contrast, in 2010, nearly 81% of those 6.4 million
children were placed in a general education classroom for 40-100% of their school day. Id.
(second table). Over 60% of the children were in the general education classroom between
80-100% of the school day. Id.
131
Debra Chopp, “School Districts and Families under the IDEA: Collaborative in
Theory, Adversarial in Fact,” 32 NAT’L. ASS’N. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 423, 454-57 (2012).
126
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pools. 132 In addition, most state funding mechanisms provide increased
funding to districts based on a calculation of the level of service being
provided to all children with disabilities in the district. 133
On the other side of the table, advocates for families contend that due
process is too expensive for most parents because they cannot afford to pay
the fees of attorneys and expert witnesses who are needed to litigate a
special education dispute. 134 Indeed, it is a focus of legislative action by
parent-child advocacy groups that IDEA be amended to ease the recovery of
attorneys’ fees and to allow the recovery of expert witness fees. 135
On this topic of cost, some scholars raise the very real concern that the
current structure disproportionately favors wealthier parents whose income
allows them to advocate for their child in a due process proceeding, when
lower income parents are unable to bear the litigation costs and therefore
cannot advocate for their children similarly. 136 This inequality of access to
due process becomes an even more acute problem when one considers that,
statistically, children with disabilities are more likely to be a member of a
lower-income family 137
The other main criticism of the current due process system is that, as a
form of litigation, it is anti-collaborative and poisons the school-parent
relationship, ultimately to the detriment of the child. 138 Unlike many other
disputes, a special education dispute involves two parties who need to
maintain a working relationship that will last as long as the child resides in
the school district. 139 In addition, each of the parties has a genuine interest
in producing a good educational outcome for the child even as they might
differ about the means to accomplish that goal. Given this dynamic, some
argue that special education dispute resolution should take a form that is as
removed from an adversarial, litigation process as possible. 140
These criticisms of due process have led to widely-varying proposals for
change. There are essentially five main proposals, each of which is
described below. Before describing these proposals, however, it is helpful
to briefly consider issues that commonly give rise to a special education
132

Weber, supra note 14, at 506.
Id.
134
See, e.g., Hyman, supra note 10, at 112-13.
135
COUNCIL OF PARENT ATTORNEYS AND ADVOCATES, PUBLIC POLICY, Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 2004, http://www.copaa.org/?page=IDEA (2012)
(advocating for statutory amendments to provide for the payment of expert witness fees
and attorneys’ fees in special education disputes).
136
See, e.g., Pasachoff, supra note 12, at 1430-33; Hyman, supra note 10.
137
Pasachoff, supra note 12, at 1432.
138
Moses, supra note 3, at 4.
139
Id.
140
Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 551.
133
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dispute.
B. Common Issues in Special Education Disputes.
The first “decision point” in the process of receiving special education
services is a determination by the school district that a child meets IDEA’s
definition of a “child with a disability.” 141 IDEA defines a child with a
disability as a child who fits into at least one of thirteen identified disability
categories. 142 In addition, the child’s disability must “adversely affect” the
child’s educational performance such that the child needs special education
services in order to access the educational curriculum. 143 Thus, eligibility is
one topic that could be the subject of a dispute.
Once a child is deemed eligible for special education, the school district,
together with the child’s parents, is required to prepare an individualized
educational program (IEP) for the child. The IEP document has been
described as the “cornerstone” of the child’s right to an appropriate
education. 144 The IEP is a written document that contains very detailed
provisions about the child’s levels of educational performance, statements
of the projected goals and objectives for the child’s progress in the coming
year, the means by which the child’s progress will be measured and
reported to the parents, the level and type of services to be provided, and the
educational setting, among other details. 145 Given the IEP’s importance, it
is not surprising that many disputes involve disagreements about the
contents of a child’s IEP.
The child’s educational placement – the setting or classroom where the
child will receive services – also can be the subject of a dispute. IDEA
provides that a child with a disability should receive services in the least
restrictive environment 146 that will allow the child to learn. Special
education is to be provided along a “continuum of alternative
placements” 147 that can range from placement in the general education
classroom to placement in a private school or residential facility at public

141

20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (2012).
20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2012).
143
34 C.F.R. § 300.8 (2007) (defining a “child with a disability”).
144
See, e.g., White ex rel. White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 378 (5th
Cir. 2003) (“[t]he cornerstone of the IDEA is the IEP”); Tenn. Dep't of Mental Health &
Mental Retardation v. Paul B., 88 F.3d 1466, 1471 (6th Cir. 1996), citing Honig v. Doe,
484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988) (“[t]he development and implementation of the IEP are the
cornerstones of the Act”).
145
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)-(4) (2012); 20 U.S.C § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(V)-(VI) (2012).
146
20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(5)(A) (2012).
147
34 C.F.R. 300.115 (2006).
142
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expense. 148 Parents often have very strong views about whether their child
should or should not be mainstreamed or included in the general education
environment. 149 For this reason, appropriate placement frequently is a
disputed matter.
There are a myriad of other remaining issues that could be the subject of
a dispute. 150 A child with a disability who violates the school code of
conduct may be subject to discipline, but only if the school determines that
the child’s conduct was not a manifestation of the child’s disability. 151 A
parent may file due process to contest a disciplinary matter, arguing that the
child’s conduct was a manifestation of the child’s disability. A parent also
may file due process on the ground that the district failed to provide the
services that had been agreed upon in the child’s IEP. 152 A parent might
file due process relating to the child’s entitlement to “extended school year”
(ESY), or summer, services. 153
All of these varied potential areas for dispute are important to keep in
mind when evaluating the proposals to modify the due process structure.
C. Proposals to Reform Due Process.
1. IEP Facilitation.

148

20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(B) (2012) (addressing placement of children in private
schools by public agencies).
149
Ruth A. Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154
U. PENN. L. REV. 789, 811-14 (2006) (describing circumstances where parents and school
districts are likely to disagree about integration and placement).
150
Cali Cope-Kasten, Bidding (Fair)well to Due Process: The Need for a Fairer Final
Stage in Special Education Dispute Resolution, 42 J. L. & EDUC. 501 (2013); see also Perry
A. Zirkel & Cathy A. Skidmore, National Trends in Frequency and Outcome of Hearing
and Review Officer Decisions under the IDEA: An Empirical Analysis, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 525, 543 (2014) (identifying different categories of issues to be resolved by
due process hearing officers).
151
See Cope-Kasten, supra note 150, at Appendix A (reporting the results of a review
of 210 due process hearings held in Wisconsin and Minnesota from 2000-2011, noting that
38% involved a dispute about evaluation, 6% involved a dispute about disciplinary issues,
and 6% involved a dispute about teacher qualifications).
152
See, e.g., Damian J. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 2008 WL 191176 (E.D. Pa., Jan. 22,
2008) (awarding compensatory education because the school district had failed to
implement the IEP goals and objectives). Compensatory education has been described as
the “poor man’s tuition reimbursement” because it is a form of relief that parents can
request when the school district failed to provide the child with a FAPE either by
implementing an inadequate IEP or by failing to provide the services that were agreedupon in the IEP. See Terry Jean Seligman and Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education
for IDEA Violations: The Silly Putty of Remedies, 45 URB. LAW. 281, 295 (2013).
153
34 C.F.R. § 300.106 (2007).
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In an effort to limit disputes that can arise during the IEP process,
approximately twenty-nine states have initiated programs known generally
as IEP facilitation. 154 IEP facilitation is not required by IDEA. Rather, it is
a voluntary process that the parties may use to resolve disputes about the
contents of a child’s IEP.
The dynamics of the IEP process are such that it is a common point at
which disputes arise. 155 It is the school district’s obligation to draft the
IEP, 156 and district employees obviously have a great deal of knowledge
and experience since they draft IEPs for all eligible children in the district.
In contrast, many parents are not experts in writing IEPs. 157 Because it is
the district’s obligation to draft the IEP and the parent’s obligation
essentially to “read and approve,” 158 a power imbalance can result. 159 The
district’s employees naturally have an upper hand in asserting positions in
an IEP meeting and, in fact, some educators may resent parent input
because of the educators’ belief that they are the experts in the field. 160
In addition, given IDEA’s requirements for attendance at IEP meetings,
when the meeting is held, the child’s parent(s) will be in a room with
several district employees. 161 Parents can begin to feel outnumbered, with
the result that they sometimes are reluctant to express their opinions
freely. 162 Parents also often perceive that their opinions are discounted.
Parents report that district employees often make patronizing comments
about parents’ affection for their child, with the undertone that the parent’s
opinions stem from emotion rather than reasoned judgment about
appropriate educational services for the child. 163
154

CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., Process and
Practice
Information,
(last
visited
Jan.
24,
2014),
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/ctu/processdefs14.cfm?thisid=12; Blau, supra note
97, at 78-9.
155
Chopp, supra note 131, at 432-38.
156
20 U.S.C. 1412 (a)(4) (2012).
157
Chopp, supra note 131, at 434.
158
Id.
159
Blau, supra note 97, at 79.
160
Erin Phillips, When Parents Aren’t Enough: External Advocacy in Special
Education,” 117 YALE L.J. 1802, 1831 (2008); see also Nancy Welsh, Stepping Back
Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real Disputants about
Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 573, 615-17
(2004). For a review of the literature detailing studies of parents’ perceptions of the IEP
process, see CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., Parents’
Experiences with the IEP Process: Considerations for Improving Practice (April 2010)
(http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Parent-IEP%20Process.pdf).
161
20 U.S.C. 1414(d)(1)(B) (2012) (describing the various school personnel who are
part of a child’s IEP team).
162
Chopp, supra note 131, at 432.
163
Id. at 433 (“parents are seen by school districts as lacking emotional distance....”).
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Given these dynamics and the importance of the IEP in ensuring that the
child receives appropriate services, the idea developed that the presence of a
neutral third-party in an IEP meeting could help level the playing field
between parents and school personnel. 164 Facilitated IEP meetings occur
when a neutral third-party assists in the organization and discussion of an
IEP meeting, with the goal of ensuring that the parties remained focused on
future action, specifically the process of writing a document that will serve
the best interests of the child. 165 The parties can agree to use IEP
facilitation at any point during the process of drafting a child’s IEP and,
ideally, IEP facilitation will be used as soon as an “acrimonious climate”
begins to develop. 166
The role of the IEP facilitator has been described as “focus[ing] on the
dynamics of the meeting” 167 to ensure that all attendees have an opportunity
to fully express their views, that attendees listen respectfully to others, and
that the attendees direct their efforts to finding common ground as a means
to resolve the matter. 168 The facilitator is to “establish ground rules for the
meeting, aid participants in developing clarifying questions which often
lean to mutual solutions and require members of the team to adhere to
timelines for completion of the meeting.” 169 The IEP facilitator is not
present to offer opinions about the strengths or weaknesses of a particular
party’s position or to otherwise negotiate the terms of the IEP document.
The use of IEP facilitation has expanded rapidly in the last ten years. In
2005, IEP facilitation programs existed in just eight states. 170 Today
twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have IEP facilitation
programs. 171
164

Blau, supra note 97, at 78-79 (describing IEP facilitation generally).
See Tracy C. Mueller, “IEP Facilitation: A Promising Approach to Resolving
Conflicts Between Parents and Families,” 41 TEACHING Exceptional Children 61 (Jan/Feb.
2009); It has been reported that some school district personnel are uncomfortable with IEP
facilitation because they perceive themselves as more experienced in writing IEP and
question the facilitator’s knowledge or expertise in the area. Kelly Henderson, “Optional
IDEA
Alternative
Dispute
Resolution”
13
(2008)
(available
at
http://www.nasdse.org/publications-t577/optional-idea-alternative-dispute-resolution.aspx).
166
Edward Feinberg, et. al., “Beyond Mediation: Strategies for Appropriate Early
Dispute
Resolution
in
Special
Education,”
at
23
(available
at
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Beyond%20Mediation.pdf.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Mueller, supra note 11, at 64, citing Feinberg, supra note 166.
170
Moses, supra note 3, at 8.
171
Id.; see also CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC.,
Process
and
Practice
Information,
(last
visited
Jan.
24,
2014),
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/ctu/processdefs14.cfm?thisid=12 (information on
CADRE’s website about IEP facilitation programs in various states). Those states are
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
165
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CADRE has been an early and strong supporter of IEP Facilitation.172
CADRE’s website contains a great deal of information about IEP
facilitation, including results of surveys completed by parties who had
participated in IEP facilitation. 173 These surveys indicate a high level of
satisfaction with the process. 174
2. Public Enforcement of IDEA.

Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
While there is no statewide program, some local school districts within Kansas offer
IEP facilitation. See, e.g., OLATHE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SPECIAL SERVICES, OLATHE SPECIAL
SERVICES
SITE
COUNCIL
2013-2014
(Mar.
2013),
http://schools.olatheschools.com/buildings/north/files/2012/06/Special-ServiceEnglish.pdf.
In addition, several other states have either had IEP facilitation programs in the past or
are contemplating an IEP facilitation program. Indiana had an IEP facilitation project, but
funding has ended. CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., CoFacilitation IEP Meeting Project
- Indiana (last visited Jan. 24, 2015),
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/ctu/practicesA.cfm?id=61. In June 2014, the New
York State Education Department posted a request for applications to participate in an IEP
Facilitation pilot program scheduled to begin in 2015. N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP’T, SPECIAL
EDUC., Request for Applications – Individualized Education Program (IEP) Facilitators,
http://www.p12.nysed.gov/specialed/applications/IEPfacilitatorrequest.htm (last updated
June 9, 2014). In 2012, the Georgia State Advisory Panel for Special Education apparently
explored the idea of having facilitated IEP meetings and tentatively planned to implement a
full program by 2015. GA. DEP’T OF EDUC., Minutes Summary: State Advisory Panel
Meeting (April 26-27, 2012). Florida officials apparently also have discussed IEP
facilitation. See FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., Meeting Report: State Advisory Committee for the
Education
of
Exceptional
Students
(Aug.
5-6,
2013)
(
http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/7571/urlt/0086224-aug2013.pdf).
Missouri is
considering IEP facilitation. MO. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC.,
Minutes: Special Education Advisory Panel Meeting (Mar. 7, 2014),
http://dese.mo.gov/sites/default/files/se-seap-special-education-advisory-panel-minutes314.pdf.
172
See Moses, supra note 3, at 6; Feinberg, supra note 166, at 23; CTR. FOR
APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., Facilitated IEP Meetings: An
Emerging
Practice
(published
November
2004)
(available
at
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Facilitated%20IEP%20for%20CADRE%20Engl
ish.pdf).
173
CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., Post IEP
Facilitation
Facilitator
Survey
Results
2007-2008,
(November
2008),
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/exemplar/artifacts/WI20%20Post%20IEP%20Facilitators%20Survey%20NOV08.pdf.
174
See,
e.g.,
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/NC-0809FacilitationEndYearReport.pdf (providing results of a survey conducted in Wisconsin
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As stated above, some scholars criticize the due process structure as a
system that, due to its reliance on parents as the child’s advocate,
disproportionately favors wealthier and more educated families who have
the means to pursue due process. 175 To counteract this inequality, these
scholars recommend several steps to enhance public enforcement of IDEA’s
requirements. 176 One step is a proposal to increase the government’s
collection and publication of data relating to special education, with the
belief that additional public information may reduce “information
asymmetries” 177 that are thought to benefit wealthier families in the
“informational game.” 178 Examples of data that the government might
collect and publish would be more detailed data regarding the special
education classification and placement of children disaggregated by income
or socioeconomic status. 179
A more ambitious suggestion is to have the government create a
database of IEPs that would be cross-referenced with the child’s (i.e.
family’s) income. 180 One suggested benefit of such a database is that it
would allow parents without financial resources to obtain information about
the type of services received by children of wealthier families. 181 Another
suggested benefit of this database is that districts might, with the benefit of
the data, be “nudged” to avoid making class-based differences in their
treatment of children in the district. 182 The recognized impediments to the
creation of such a database are the cost involved and the risk that a child’s
personally identifiable information might be included in the data. 183
175

Pasachoff, supra note 12; Hyman, supra note 10; Alex Hurder, Left Behind with No
“IDEA”: Children with Disabilities Without Means, 34 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 283 (2014).
Indeed, soon after the passage of EAHCA, there were some concerns expressed that the
system of private enforcement might be insufficient. Note, Enforcing the Right to an
“Appropriate” Education: the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92
Harvard L. Rev. 1103 (1979).
176
Pasachoff, supra note 12, at 1461-88; Hyman, supra note 10, at 150-55 & 159-62.
These scholars also propose a number of other legislative changes, including provisions
that ease the recovery of attorneys’ fees by parents, explicit authorization to recover expert
witness fees, requiring the school district to bear the burden of proof to demonstrate
compliance with IDEA’s requirements, amending the statutory language regarding
procedural inadequacies as a basis for prevailing in a due process matter, among other
changes. Hyman, supra note 10, at 146-50 (discussing attorneys’ fees and expert witness
fees, burden of proof); Hurder, supra note 175, at 306-09 (discussing attorneys’ fees and
expert witness fees, relief for procedural violations)
177
Pasachoff, supra note 12, at 1437-40.
178
Id. at 1438.
179
Id. at 1145-46.
180
Id. at 1467-68.
181
Id. at 1468.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 1470-72.
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Another proposal is to have state educational agencies engage in
random audits or investigations of districts to assess the quality of IEPs for
low-income children. 184 The state investigators could either assess the
quality of IEPs in isolation, “without making any comparisons to other
IEPs,” 185 or compare the IEPs of “low-income and high-income students in
the same district” to determine disparities in treatment and the overall
quality of IEPs written for low-income students. If the state found
disparities in services or placement that were not “educationally
justified,” 186 then the state could order that the IEPs for those students be rewritten and that the district make “systemic changes” 187 to reduce the
possibility that disparities would continue to exist.
A third proposal is to have federal agencies be more aggressive in
investigating and, when appropriate, enforcing IDEA’s requirements in
litigation. 188
A fourth proposal is for Congress to provide funds to states that would
take steps to ensure that “poor children are provided with services as good
as those provided to wealthier children.” 189 This proposal seeks to offer
financial incentives to states that voluntarily examine the relationship
between family wealth and special education services and, when
inequalities are found, institute reforms to any disparities that are
attributable to family income. 190
A final proposal in the realm of “public enforcement” is to increase the
availability of pro bono attorneys, law school clinics, and community
advocates to help low-income families understand and access the existing
due process system. 191 This includes one proposal that is modeled after a
public defender system, in which each child is assigned a special advocate –
not necessarily an attorney – as soon as the child is identified as a child who
might be in need of special education services. 192
3. Voluntary, Binding Arbitration.
Since the 2004 Amendments to IDEA, discussion of the use of
184

Id. at 1473-74.
Id. at 1473.
186
Id. at 1475.
187
Id.
188
Hyman, supra note 10, at 159-60.
189
Pasachoff, supra note 12, at 1486.
190
Id. at 1486-87.
191
Ruth A. Colker, DISABLED EDUCATION 244-45 (2013); Hurder, supra note 175, at
306-07; Hyman, supra note 10, at 158-59.
192
Erin Phillips, “When Parents Aren’t Enough: External Advocacy in Special
Education,” 117 YALE L.J. 1802, 1847-48 (2008).
185
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voluntary, binding arbitration has continued. 193 Some scholars contend that
Congress “wisely eschewed” 194 the arbitration model because of the lack of
good evidence that arbitration would be less costly or faster than an
administrative hearing. 195 Others argue that, given the costs and delay
associated with “over-legalization” 196 of due process hearings, special
education disputes should be resolved through an arbitration process using
“a single–session hearing without judicial appeal,” 197 except in limited
circumstances involving “major new legal issues.” 198
In 2012, Professor S. James Rosenfeld published an article on the
topic. 199 Professor Rosenfeld contends that arbitration would improve
IDEA’s due process structure by providing both “a more balanced ‘access
to justice’ and swift and final decisions.” 200 Among the stated advantages
of voluntary binding arbitration would be “eliminating the need for
attorneys” 201 in order to decrease the “adversarial atmosphere” 202 of due
process. Another potential benefit would be “a much shorter timeline for
decision and implementation.” 203 A third benefit is described as an
increased “focus … on the student’s educational program” as a result of a
less-adversarial proceeding. 204 Finally, a fourth identified benefit is that the
arbitration panel, if composed as described below, would have “greater
expertise” in both the legal and teaching/educational issues than the
mediators or due process hearing officers who currently hear special
education matters. 205
Professor Rosenfeld describes his proposal as a “snapshot” 206 of a
proposed arbitration system rather than a specific proposal which, he states,
would be further developed with the input of a variety of stakeholders in the
process. 207 With that caveat, Professor Rosenfeld proposes that arbitration
193

See Rosenfeld, supra note 11.
Mark C. Weber, “Reflections on the New Individuals with Disabilities Improvement
Act,” 58 FLA. L. REV. 7, 52 (2006)
195
Id.
196
Perry A. Zirkel, The Over-Legalization of Special Education, 195 ED. LAW. REP.
35, 38 (2005).
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Rosenfeld, supra note 11.
200
Id. at 545.
201
Id. at 551.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id. at 547.
207
Id. at 551 (“None of this is meant to be exhaustive; to the contrary, it is set forth in
the hope and expectation that others can and will identify oversights and made additional
194
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would involve a three-person panel consisting of an expert in the child’s
primary disability, an expert in the field of special education (administration
or provision of services), and an attorney familiar with special education
laws. 208 The parties may opt for binding arbitration only after giving “fully
informed and completely voluntary” 209 consent, which would have to
include an explicit understanding that the parties are foregoing any right to
appeal the panel’s decision.
Professor Rosenfeld also proposes that no attorneys can be present in
the proceeding unless the parent also either has an attorney or consents to
the presence of the school district’s attorney. 210 The panel would have
“complete discretion” 211 to determine both the rules under which the
proceeding would be conducted and “the nature and scope of the evidence
(witnesses or documents) it will seek or hear.” 212 Indeed, it would be the
responsibility of the panel to “assume a controlling role in the process,”
including calling expert witnesses, questioning other witnesses, seeking
evaluations of the child, or reformulating the issues before the panel. 213 The
record of the proceeding would be confidential and “substantive challenges
to the decision” would be heard only by the panel. 214
To accomplish the goal of providing a quick resolution of the dispute,
Professor Rosenfeld proposes that the panel be required to issue its decision
within “thirty school days” 215 from the assignment of the matter to the
arbitration panel unless, due to unusual circumstances, the parties agree to
an extension of time at the beginning of the proceedings. 216 Professor
Rosenfeld further proposes that the decision should be written as a “quasiIEP” with a description of goals, programs, and services to be provided. 217
To ensure that the parties comply with the terms of the arbitration decision,
Professor Rosenfeld proposes that the state educational agency be given
authority to enforce the terms of the decision, and that the SEA be required
suggestions.”).
208
Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 561-563
209
Id. at 552.
210
Id. at 554.
211
Id.
212
Id. This part of the proposal implies that parents would lose rights currently
available under IDEA, including the rights to “present evidence and confront, crossexamine, and compel the attendance of witnesses.” 20 U.S.C. §1415(h)(2) (2012).
213
Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 560-61.
214
Id.
215
Id. at 557. This timeline thus is essentially the same as the forty-five day period for
resolving a due process matter that had been required by IDEA before Congress added the
thirty-day resolution session period in 2004. See note 2, supra. Thirty school days equals
forty-two calendar days. (five school days in a week times six weeks).
216
Id.
217
Id. at 557.
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to “assure compliance” within fifteen days after receiving a complaint,
presumably filed by the parent, that the decision is not being implemented
properly. 218
Professor Rosenfeld does not propose that arbitration replace the current
due process structure, only that it be added to IDEA as another dispute
resolution system that the parties can choose to access. 219
4. A Radical Overhaul of Special Education Due Process.
In July 2013, the American Association of School Administrators
(AASA) published a report proposing “critical changes” 220 to special
education due process. 221 The AASA contends that, for a number of
reasons, the current due process system is not working well. In addition to
the criticisms noted above, specifically that due process costs too much, 222
unfairly disadvantages lower-income families, and “breeds hostility”223
between parents and school officials, the AASA sets forth several additional
reasons why the current due process structure is either obsolete or
ineffective.
The AASA first contends that the current due process structure has
become obsolete due to changes in federal education legislation, particularly
the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act 224 and the 2004 amendments to IDEA.
AASA cites the data reporting requirements of NCLB and IDEA as
“wield[ing] significant pressure on districts” 225 such that due process “no

218

Id. at 558.
Id. at 566.
220
Pudelski, supra note 9, at 2.
221
Pudelski, supra note 9.
222
The AASA cites a survey it conducted of 200 school superintendents across the
country, in which the survey respondents indicated that school districts may budget
between $12,000 and $50,000 per year to address potential costs associated with due
process or litigation. Id. at 13. National data on annual school budgets indicates that, on
average, $50,000 is a modest sum for most school districts in the nation. In the 2009-2010
school year, there were 13,625 “regular” school districts in the United States with total
revenues of $597 billion. DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2012, at 146 tbl. 100 (number
of public elementary and secondary education agencies); Id. at 315 tbl. 203 (revenue for
public elementary and secondary schools). Thus, the average school budget was $43.8
million dollars. Using that figure, $50,000 is 0.00114% of the average school budget.
$12,000 is 0.00027% of the average school budget.
The AASA did acknowledge that districts can purchase insurance to cover the
litigation costs of special education due process. Id. at 14 (citing annual premiums between
$2,500 and $10,000).
223
Id. at 9.
224
Pub. Law. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
225
Pudelski, supra note 9, at 7.
219
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longer serves as a powerful compliance lever.” 226
The AASA also implies that the current structure is unnecessary
because children with disabilities no longer need robust due process
protections they might have needed in the past, stating that “[t]he inclusion
of people with disabilities in all walks of life is now a given.” 227 This
proposition is belied by current events demonstrating that children with
disabilities are often the subject of bullying and hatred, 228 sometimes even
at the hands of school employees. 229
Another cited reason for overhauling the current structure is the lack of
data demonstrating that success in a due process hearing leads to a better
educational outcome for the student. 230 This is an argument in the negative;
the lack of any data, positive or negative, leads the AASA to conclude that
the system does not work. 231
In addition, reciting several anecdotal stories, the AASA asserts that due
process adversely affects teacher retention in the field of special
education. 232 In fact, the retention of special education teachers is subject to
a myriad of factors, including salary consideration, school climate, and
226

Pudelski, supra note 9, at 9. The AASA proposal contends that district compliance
is driven by the potential for adverse consequences under federal law, including loss of
federal funding, “intensive state monitoring,” id., or state-level imposed mandated
improvement activities. Id.
227
Id. at 16.
228
See, e.g., Trudi Bird and Joe Kemp, Family of 13-year-old Autistic Boy Disgusted
After Hate-Filled Letter is Slipped Under Their Door Urging Them to ‘Euthanize’ Boy for
Being a Neighborhood ‘Nuisance’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 20, 2013,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/disgusting-father-hate-filled-letter-euthanizeautistic-son-nuisance-article-1.1431505; Associated Press, Prosecutors Mull Charges
Against Teen Accused in Prank ‘Ice Bucket Challenge’ on Autistic Boy, HUFFINGTON POST,
Sept. 17, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/17/ice-bucket-prank-autism_n_5834882.html.
229
Associated Press, Olympia Bus Driver Accused of Bullying Disabled Girl,
KOMONEWS.COM, Apr. 23, 2014, http://www.komonews.com/news/local/Olympiaschool-bus-driver-accused-of-bullying-girl-256352061.html; Koehler v. Juaniata Cty. Sch.
Dist., 2008 WL 1787632 (M.D. Pa., April 17, 2008) (teachers placed a non-verbal autistic
child in a thermally insulated, camouflage jumpsuit, sealed the jumpsuit with duct tape,
raised the temperature in the room, and locked the child in the room alone; the court held
that the parent, on behalf of the child, could pursue claims under both federal and state law
against the school district and individual employees).
230
Pudelski, supra note 9, at 7.
231
Id. at 21 (criticizing the lack of any follow-up after a due process decision to
determine whether the outcome of due process “positively or negatively affected student
performance.”). Professor Mark Weber notes that the data demanded by AASA would be
very difficult to obtain, noting that “a researcher would be hard put to design a controlled
experiment that would be consistent with ethical practices that would test that hypothesis.”
Weber, supra note 14, at 511.
232
Pudelski, supra note 9, at 12-13.
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administrative support, among others. 233 Although “paperwork” has been
identified as one cause leading to special education teacher attrition, neither
due process nor litigation is specifically cited as a reason why a special
education teacher might leave the field. 234
What does the AASA propose? The AASA describes its proposal as
“two-pronged approach” 235 designed to make it “more difficult for litigation
to occur.” 236 Indeed, the AASA acknowledges an overall goal to “creat[e] a
‘lawyer-free system’ [in which] “costs for districts will be significantly
reduced.” 237
The AASA proposal requires the parties to engage in IEP facilitation
with state-provided, trained facilitator before any form of due process or
litigation could be pursued. 238 No lawyers or advocates may be present in
the IEP facilitation meeting. 239 The AASA proposal does not describe
procedures to be used if the special education dispute did not an involve
issue relating to a child’s IEP.
If IEP facilitation fails to resolve the dispute, then the parties must
engage in mediation. 240 Again, no lawyers may be present and, for some
reason, no legally binding agreement could be created. 241
If mediation fails, the AASA proposal would then require the joint
selection of an “independent, neutral, special education consultant
designated by the state to…advise the parties on how to devise a suitable
compromise IEP.” 242 The consultant, once notified of the request for his or
her services, would have fifteen days to hold an initial meeting with the
parties. 243 Following that meeting, the consultant would have an additional
twenty-one 244 days to make observations, review records, and write an
IEP. 245 The parties then “would be obligated to follow the consultantdesigned IEP for a mutually agreed upon period of time” 246 that is not
233

See Bonnie S. Billingsley, Special Education Teacher Retention and Attrition: A
Critical Analysis of the Literature, at 37 (April 2003) (available at
http://copsse.education.ufl.edu/docs/RS-2/1/RS-2.pdf.
234
Id. at 23.
235
Pudelski, supra note 9, at 17.
236
Id.
237
Id. at 22.
238
Id. at 18.
239
Id.
240
Id. at 19.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 4, 20.
243
Id. at 20.
244
The AASA proposal in one section refers to a twenty-one day period, Id. at 20, but,
in another section, refers to a thirty-day period. Id. at 21, n.70.
245
Id. at 20-21.
246
Id. at 4.
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specified. Again, this is a step in the process where lawyers would not be
involved. 247
If, after all of the procedures described above – IEP Facilitation,
voluntary mediation, implementation of a consultant-written IEP – have
been satisfied, any party who wishes to pursue the matter further may file a
“lawsuit in federal court.” 248 Thus, the AASA proposal would “abolish[] the
[due process] hearing system” 249 entirely. 250
The AASA’s proposal has been recognized by scholars, 251 advocacy
groups 252 and practitioners 253 as an attempt to weaken the procedural
protections IDEA currently grants to children and their parents. Indeed,
although the AASA report cited Professor Rosenfeld’s proposal for
voluntary, binding arbitration with approval, Professor Rosenfeld himself
has disavowed any association with the AASA proposal. 254
5. Defending the Current Structure.
The fifth main proposal to modify the special education due process is
actually labelled as a “defense” of due process. 255 In a recent article,
Professor Mark Weber contends that the criticisms of the system are “badly
247

Id. at 22 (describing the consultancy system as a “lawyer-free system” that would
“level the playing field between low-income families and districts in IDEA disputes”).
248
Id. at 20.
249
Id. at 21.
250
Id. at 23 (noting that the proposal would “replac[e] the due process system”).
251
Weber, supra note 14; See Yael Cannon, et. al., A Solution Hiding in Plain Sight:
Special Education and Better Outcomes for Children with Social, Emotional and
Behavioral Challenges, 41 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 403, 490 (2013).
252
See, e.g., COUNCIL OF PARENT ATTORNEYS AND ADVOCATES, NEWS & PRESS:
POLICY, AASA Document Nothing More Than A Shameful Attack on Parent and Student
Civil Rights, http://www.copaa.org/news/121292/AASA-Document-Nothing-More-ThanA-Shameful-Attack-on-Parent-and-Student-Civil-Rights-.html, (Apr. 4, 2013).
253
Gregory Branch, Orange County Special Education Attorney Opposes AASA
Proposal, THE LAW OFFICE OF GREGORY R. BRANCH L. BLOG (Apr. 28, 2013),
http://www.ocspecialedattorney.com/orange-county-special-education-attorney-opposesaasa-proposal/ (describing the AASA proposal as “unfairly tilting the balance of power” in
favor of school districts, which would be represented by a “highly-trained district office
administrator, many of whom hold doctorate degrees in education or more specifically
special education….”); see also Mary Richard, AASA, the Emperor’s New Clothes, Special
Education Mediations and Due Process Hearings, SPECIAL EDUC. L. IN IOWA BLOG,
http://specialeducationlawmmr.blogspot.com/2013/04/aasa-emperors-new-clothesspecial.html.
254
S. James Rosenfeld, Director’s Statement on AASA Report on Due Process, NAT’L
ACAD.
FOR
IDEA
ADMIN.
JUDGES
AND
HEARING
OFFICERS,
http://www.law.seattleu.edu/continuing-legal-education/upcoming-programs/idea-aljhoacademy.
255
Weber, supra note 14.
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overblown” 256 and that the system generally is cost-effective and yields
good results for parents, particularly when compared to litigation outcomes
in other contexts. 257 He proposes that, with only “a few modest
reforms,” 258 the current structure would meet the parties’ expectations and
fulfill IDEA’s goals.
Professor Weber acknowledges that income inequality affect parents’
abilities to pursue due process, but notes that such inequality exists
throughout our legal and economic systems. 259 He argues that income
inequality is not a reason to radically overhaul the system, noting that there
is a “ripple effect of successful due process hearings” 260 under which
litigation funded by higher income families has some benefit to other
children in the system by creating good law, leading to statutory
amendments and the like. 261 He also notes that due process decisions
awarding tuition reimbursement to wealthier parents for private placements
can lead school districts to improve or create programs within the public
school system that benefit additional children. 262
As noted above, 263 Professor Weber also takes issue with the notion that
successful due process pursued by wealthier families leaves other children
with fewer services. Among the reasons he gives are that often parents may
not be asking for more expensive services (citing the example where parents
want a child to be educated in the least restrictive environment) and the fact
that states often allocate more money to districts that serve students with
greater needs. 264
Professor Weber also challenges the belief that due process structure is
too costly for school districts. 265 He cites a 2003 study by the Government
Accounting Office, which found that the number of formal special
education disputes was relatively low and a 2013 CADRE report indicating

256

Id. at 495
Id. at 510.
258
Id. at 495.
259
Id. at 503, citing Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculation
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
260
Id. at 505.
261
Id. at 505-06;
262
Id.; see also Daniela Caruso, Bargaining and Distribution in Special Education, 14
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 181 (2005) (“[O]utspoken parents may serve the interests
of all children in the school district and, by informational spillover, of the nation. In this
light, the distribution of resources among children with disabilities may not be a zero-sum
game. … The advocacy work of some parents may pay dividends for everyone; it raises the
standards of appropriate special education and augments the rights of all children.”).
263
Part II.A., supra.
264
Weber, supra note 14, at 505-07.
265
Id. at 508-09.
257

32

EVERY DAY COUNTS

[]

that due process hearing requests and hearings have been declining. 266
Indeed, statistics contained within the AASA’s own proposal support
Professor Weber’s opinion. The AASA’s survey of school administrators
indicates that the number of disputes is low. 267 More than one-half (51%)
of the school superintendents who responded to the AASA survey had not
“been involved in special education litigation or due process in the past five
years.” 268 Ninety percent of the survey respondents had had fewer than five
due process hearings in the last five years. 269
Professor Weber proposes that due process could be improved with
“modest procedural changes” 270 designed to streamline the due process
proceedings and, in some cases, strengthen parents’ positions in due
process. 271 He proposes (a) amending IDEA to allow parents who prevail
in due process to recover expert witness fees; (b) relaxing the rules about
exhaustion of administrative proceedings; (c) streamlining due process
proceedings by, among other things, minimizing pre-hearing motion
practice; (e) enhancing the training of IHOs; and (e) clarifying the means to
enforce a settlement reached in a special education dispute. 272
III.

THE SURVEY

In 2014, I decided to survey special education attorneys regarding the
current due process structure and facets of some of the proposals described
above. The idea to conduct a survey came from anecdotal conversations
with special education attorneys in Ohio about due process. 273 These
attorneys opined that the resolution session usually was a waste of the
parties’ time. They also expressed the view that the hearing officer system
in Ohio was deficient in many respects, a view that Professor Ruth Colker
266

Id.
Pudelski, supra note 9, at 9-10.
268
Id. at 10.
269
Id. at 9-10. The AASA report reports that just seven percent of districts had six to
ten due process hearings within the last five years and three percent of districts had eleven
or more hearings over the same period.
270
Weber, supra note 14, at 520.
271
Id.
272
Id. at 520-23.
273
I teach a course in Special Education law and, during the semester, I invite area
attorneys who practice special education law to come and speak with my class. For several
years, I and my students have been lucky enough to have two highly experienced attorneys
come to share their views. Kerry Agins is a well-respected attorney in the Cleveland area
who represents parents and their children in special education disputes.
See
http://www.siegelaginsandgilman.com/About-Kerry-Agins.html.
Kathryn Perrico is
another excellent special education attorney whose clients are school districts and
personnel. See http://www.ohioedlaw.com/kathryn-i-perrico.
267
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outlined in a recent article. 274 These conversations piqued my interest in
ascertaining what practitioners thought about the current structure and
proposals to change the structure.
Once I decided to create a survey, I considered the topics that might be
covered. I was very interested in obtaining practitioners’ views about the
effectiveness of the resolution session. I also was very interested in hearing
practitioners’ views about IEP facilitation. Finally, I wanted to get
feedback on both the voluntary, binding arbitration model and aspects of the
AASA proposal.
To those topics, I added a topic that has not received a great deal of indepth attention in the scholarship, namely the relative benefits or costs of a
one-tier due process structure, as opposed to a two-tier due process. 275
Again, it was my Ohio-based focus that caused me to be interested in this
topic. Ohio is one of just eight states with a two-tier structure. 276
For two reasons, I omitted any questions about the use of mediation to
settle special education disputes. First, the use of mediation as a means to
resolve special education disputes is so widely accepted that any further
amendments to IDEA likely would not address mediation. 277 Second, given
all of the other topics to be covered and a concern that the survey would
become excessively long, I decided to omit mediation as a topic.
My target audience was attorneys who are actively engaged in the
practice of special education law. 278 I did not quantify the target population
of special education attorneys nationwide. Rather, I attempted to reach as
many special education attorneys as I could through a variety of efforts.
First, I contacted non-profit organizations, including the Education Law
274

Colker, supra note 69..
Id. at 406.
276
The survey did also ask a number of questions about quality and training of hearing
officers, however, that topic will be the subject of a later article.
277
See e.g., Feinberg, supra note 169, at 8 (indicating high levels of satisfaction with
the use of mediation to resolve special education disputes).
278
There are special education “lay advocates,” who assist parents in seeking special
education services but may not handle due process matters or litigation. For information
about the use of law advocates, see Eileen M. Ahern, THE INVOLVEMENT OF LAW
(October 2001), available at
ADVOCATES
IN
DUE
PROCESS
HEARINGS
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/The_Involv4449.cfm; see also Kay Hennessy Seven
& Perry A. Zirkel, In the Matter of Arons: Construction of the IDEA’s Lay Advocate
Provision Too Narrow, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 193 (2002).
I recognize that lay advocates can provide invaluable services to parents. Id. at 212-14
(discussing the value of lay advocates in the field of special education). However, because
lay advocates may include individuals who do not handle due process or otherwise make
strategic legal decisions in a dispute, I sought to limit their involvement in the survey by
asking the survey respondents whether they were “an attorney with an active practice in
Education Law” and filtering responses based on the answer.
275
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Association, 279 The National School Boards Association, 280 and the Council
of Parent Attorneys and Advocates. 281 I asked those organizations to
distribute the survey to their members, and they agreed to do so, for which I
thank them. 282 Second, I contacted individual attorneys whose names and
email addresses I obtained by searching websites with lists of special
education practitioners. 283 Third, I searched on the Internet to find
attorneys who advertised their expertise in special education law. 284 I also
reviewed the publicly-available special education due process decisions to
find the names and contact information for counsel who had represented
parties in due process hearings. 285
The survey was an anonymous and voluntary one that respondents
completed online. 286 The survey respondents were able to exit the survey at
any time. The survey was designed to obtain both quantitative and
qualitative information through the use of both Likert-type questions and
open-ended questions with space for the respondents to provide narrative
answers.
Responses were collected between June 23, 2014 and November 18,
2014. Three hundred and ninety-three individuals completed the survey. 287
Of that number, 355 respondents had an active practice in education law.
One hundred and sixty-six of respondents indicated that he or she had an
279

www.educationlaw.org.
www.nsba.org.
281
www.copaa.org
282
Emails from Cate Smith, Executive Director of ELA, Sonja Trainor, Director,
Council of School Attorneys of NASB, and Denise Marshall, Executive Director of
COPAA are on file with the author.
283
See,
e.g.,
http://www.yellowpagesforkids.com;
http://www.autismspeaks.org/resource-guide/by-state/81/Attorneys/OH;
http://www.quakerschool.org/resources/special-education-attorneys;
http://advocatesforspecialeducation.com/index.html;
http://www.mnmsba.org/Resources/COSA;
284
See,
e.g.,
http://www.specialneedsnewyork.com/attorneys;
http://www.specialeducationattorneyatlaw.com; http://www.wefight4you.com/californiaattorneys/hans-gillinger.
285
See, e.g., http://www.gadoe.org/Curriculum-Instruction-and-Assessment/SpecialEducation-Services/Pages/Due-Process-Hearing-Decisions-.aspx;
http://www.edresourcesohio.org/due-process-decisions. In some states, the attorneyidentifying information is redacted.
286
The survey was designed using Qualtrics software licensed to the University of
Akron. The survey was exempt from IRB review by the University of Akron’s
Institutional Review Board. A letter to that effect is on file with the author. The survey
questions also are on file with the author.
287
Five hundred and eighty-one individuals began the survey, yielding a dropout rate
of thirty-two percent. I solicited responses from practitioners in the fifty U.S. states and the
District of Columbia.
280
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active practice representing school districts, boards of education or school
personnel, of which ninety-four of those individuals (57%) indicated that
100% of their clients were school-related personnel or entities. 288 Two
hundred and forty-three of respondents indicated that his or her clients were
parents and/or children seeking rights under IDEA; one hundred and sixteen
of those attorneys (48%) indicated that 100% of the clients were parents and
children. 289
A. IEP Facilitation.
The survey first asked whether the respondents had any experience with
IEP facilitation. One hundred and seventeen of the school district attorneys
indicated that they had experience with IEP facilitation. One hundred and
forty of the parent-child attorneys indicated that they had experience with
IEP facilitation. 290
Broken into those subgroups, the school district attorneys were more
positive about the use of IEP facilitation as a means to resolve disputes.
When asked whether IEP facilitation was a “valuable vehicle to resolve
disagreements quickly,” and provided with a Likert-type scale, 291 twelve
school district attorneys (11%) strongly agreed with that proposition, and
fifty-two (49%) agreed with the proposition. 292 Twelve school district
attorneys (11%) disagreed with the proposition, and four (4%) strongly
disagreed with the proposition.
Of the parent-child attorneys who responded to the same question, just
five (4%) strongly agreed with the proposition, while thirty-three
individuals (29%) agreed with the proposition. Thirty-three parent-child
attorneys (29%) disagreed with the proposition, and another ten (9%)
strongly disagreed with the proposition.
Twenty-six school district attorneys (25%) and thirty-four of the parent288

Ninety-four respondents (57%) indicated that 100% of clients were school-related
personnel or entities. Fifty-seven respondents (34%) indicated that 76-99% of clients were
school-related personnel or entities, and another fifteen respondents (9%) indicates that
between 51-75% of clients were school-related personnel or entities.
289
One hundred and sixteen respondents (48%) indicated that 100% of clients were
parents/children. Ninety-six respondents (40%) indicated that 76-99% of clients were
parents/children, and another thirty-one respondents (13%) indicates that between 51-75%
of clients were parents/children.
290
The term “school district attorney” refers to survey respondents who represent
school districts or school personnel. The term “parent-child attorney” refers to survey
respondents parents and children.
291
The survey gave five possible responses: strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree
nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree.
292
Because the survey respondents were allowed to skip questions in the survey, the
number of respondents changes slightly from question to question.
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child attorneys (30%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposition,
taking essential a neutral stance on the value of IEP facilitation.
The use of IEP facilitation as a means to avoid due process received
mixed results. Of the school district attorneys, just seven respondents (7%)
strongly agreed that IEP facilitation “often resolves disagreements, thereby
avoiding the filing of a due process complaint.” Thirty-eight school district
attorneys (37%) agreed with the proposition. Thirty school district
attorneys (29%) neither agreed nor disagreed, twenty-six school district
attorneys (25%) disagreed with the proposition, and three (3%) strongly
disagreed with the proposition.
The parent-child attorneys were more negative about the use of IEP
facilitation as a means to resolve disagreements and avoid the filing of a due
process complaint. Just five parent-child attorneys (4%) strongly agreed
with the proposition. Twenty-six parent-child attorneys (23%) agreed with
the proposition; twenty-four (21%) neither agreed nor disagreed, forty-eight
(43%) disagreed, and nine (8%) strongly disagreed with the proposition.
The narrative comments provided by the survey respondents were most
revealing about their views. Overall, the respondents indicated that IEP
facilitation – in concept – could be an effective means to resolve disputes,
as noted by the following comments:
•

“I think it is an excellent way to resolve disputes. Unfortunately,
it is not always enough to resolve the parties[’] differences, but
when it is, it saves the District money and generally results in a
better program for the students. Also, it fosters relationship
building, rather than breaking relationships down.”

•

“IEP facilitation is an excellent way to keep the IEP process on
track in terms of coverage of topics, management of time and
management of conflicting personalities.”

•

“IEP facilitation provides a means for parents and school
officials to retain some control over educational issues on a local
basis, which is where the decisions should be made. It is much
less costly than due process hearing litigation and less arbitrary
than the agency complaint process.”

•

“It is particularly useful for those cases where there have been
multiple IEP team meetings and personalities have stood in the
way in terms of meaningful discussion.”

However, attorneys on both sides of the table agreed that the success
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of IEP facilitation was highly dependent on the facilitator’s skill and
training. One parent-child attorney noted: “The idea is a good one and has
the potential to work but it is entirely dependent on the individual
characteristics of the facilitator.” A school district attorney similarly stated:
“I strongly believe that IEP facilitation is valuable if the facilitator is trained
using a practical, usable approach and knows IDEA requirements well.” 293
Yet there seemed to be agreement that training of IEP facilitators
currently is a barrier to effective use of the procedure. One survey
respondent stated: “I do not believe that IEP facilitation is being conducted
by highly qualified individuals. The facilitators have not been effective in
resolving contentious matters. Their function appeared to be nothing more
than conducting the meeting.” Another comment was: “I have never
encountered any facilitator who has specific training and experience in
facilitating IEP meetings. They are ‘borrowed’ from other disciplines in the
hope that their presence will somehow add value to the process. Usually
they are superfluous to the process.” One individual succinctly stated:
“Facilitators need far more training to make the experience valuable.” 294
Interestingly, there were a few comments from attorneys on both sides
of the table indicating that the facilitators demonstrated bias towards one
party or the other. A school district attorney stated: “I do not discourage my
clients from agreeing to IEP facilitation. However, the majority of reports I
receive after the fact is that the facilitator spent most of the meeting trying
to convince the District to provide what the family was requested. My
clients often feel that the process is one-sided.” A parent-child attorney
stated: “Unfortunately, the facilitators I have worked with are often biased,
favoring the schools and school districts. Parents sense that bias and then
doubt the opinions of the facilitator.”
In addition, both school district attorneys and parent-child attorneys
recognized that IEP facilitation could not resolve all disputes, in particular
those disputes where the parties have clearly communicated their positions
and simply disagree as to the appropriate course of action for the child.
Representative comments included:
•
293

I only find IEP facilitation helpful when Districts and Parents are
having trouble communicating, but not when there is a

Another similar comment was: “I think that the facilitation process is theoretically
desirable, but a huge amount depends on the neutrality, knowledge and skill of the
facilitator, as well as the sophistication of the parents.”
294
A more barbed comment from a school district attorney was: “The facilitators I
have worked with are spectacularly ill-informed about the law and about special education
generally. They frequently suggest "compromises" that will address parental concerns but
that do not appropriately serve the child or that totally ignore IDEA requirements like RTI,
LRE and the like.”
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substantive issue regarding the appropriateness of placement or
services.
•

I believe it is a valuable means to solve disputes arising out of
miscommunication. I have not found it is a helpful means to
resolve disputes arising out of disagreement with assessment
results[,] current levels of performance and best practice with
service delivery[,] times[,] amounts and different types of
providers.

•

It can be beneficial, but when parents are lawyered up following
unilateral placement and the only issues remaining are a
monetary demand, there is no need for attention to an IEP; it's all
about money.

•

Facilitation is a tool to assist parties to find common ground and
reach agreement. When one party approaches the IEP meeting
with a fixed goal / outcome and is unable / unwilling to consider
alternatives, facili[t]ation may help to highlight the differences
but not facilitate a resolution.

The survey also asked if IEP facilitation should be mandated under
IDEA as a prerequisite that must be satisfied before a due process complaint
can be filed. An overwhelming majority of the parent-child attorneys
(88%) answered “No.” 295 A majority of the school district attorneys (57%)
also answered “No.” 296
When asked to explain their answers, those survey respondents who
favored mandatory IEP facilitation generally focused on the cost of due
process. For example, one survey respondent stated: “[D]ue process is very
expensive and the parties should be forced through several different
procedures prior to going to ‘court.’" Another point in favor of mandatory
IEP facilitation was that the mandatory meeting would make clear to all
parties that a dispute is on the horizon. In particular, one school district
attorney commented: “Too many times, due process hearings are filed
without any attempts to engage the school district in meaningful
communication about the pending issues. This results in fractured feelings
between the school personnel and the family.”
Those respondents not in favor of mandating IEP facilitation focused on
two main issues. First, many respondents commented on the low
probability of success in mandating a meeting in which the focus is
295
296

Four percent of parent-child attorneys had no opinion, and 7% answered “Yes.”
Six percent of school district attorneys had no opinion, and 38% answered “Yes.”
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collaboration: “It should never be required. If the parties do no[t] wish to do
it on their own, it will not be successful.” Another similar comment was:
“The fact that this is a voluntary process aid[]s the parties in reaching
resolution because they already have to be predisposed to it. Forcing the
facilitation where the parties are not willing to resolve their differences will
likely prove futile and frustrating and delay the process of getting to hearing
and reaching resolution.” 297
The second main issue was the burden that would result by adding
another layer to the process. One school district attorney stated: “There are
already resolution meetings or mediation requirements. No need to add a
redundant layer of ADR.” A parent-child attorney similarly commented: “It
would require an additional procedural step that might delay the parents'
right to a speedy hearing.” 298 Yet another survey respondent stated:
“Resolution sessions are already fruitless in 98% of cases. Adding another
layer will not help at all.” 299
B. Voluntary Binding Arbitration.
The survey next asked whether the respondent would support a
procedure for voluntary, binding arbitration of special education disputes. 300
Again, the response was largely negative. One hundred and thirty-nine
parent-child attorneys (67%) answered “No.” Seventy-seven school district
attorneys (57%) also answered “No.” Forty-seven parent-child attorneys
(23%) attorneys answered ‘Yes,” while forty-six school district attorneys
(33%) answered “Yes.” The remainder of both groups had no opinion. 301
The survey allowed the respondents to choose among a series of
reasons why voluntary, binding arbitration might, or might not be, a
297

A parent-child attorney stated: “There are too many variables that can result in a
poor relationship between parents and school district personnel -- on both sides. I have
seen situations where forcing a facilitated IEP meeting would only serve to increase the
trauma for the parents and further polarize the parties.”
298
Another similar comment was: “At times litigation is necessary and mandating
facilitation could be used as a delay tactic by school.”
299
A school district attorney noted: “A resolution session is already mandatory.
Unless there is to be absolutely stellar training for facilitators, it should not be required.”
300
The question read: “Should IDEA include voluntary, binding arbitration as
a dispute resolution mechanism? Assume that the arbitration panel would consist of a
(non-lawyer) expert in the child's suspected disability, a special educator with experience
administering IDEA's provisions, and a lawyer familiar with special education law,
including dispute resolution. Also assume that the arbitration decision would be binding
with no right of appeal. Both parties would have to agree to arbitration. The costs would
be borne by the state.”
301
Twenty parent-child attorneys (10%) had no opinion, while eighteen school district
attorneys (13%) had no opinion.
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valuable ADR mechanism. One hundred and forty-five parent-child
attorneys (73%) cited the lack of an appeal right as a reason not to support
voluntary, binding arbitration; the lack of an appeal right was cited by sixtytwo school district attorneys (48%) as a potential reason not to support
voluntary, binding arbitration. Sixty-eight school district attorneys (53%)
indicated that, so long as arbitration was an option that the parties could
choose voluntarily, it could be included in IDEA. Seventy parent-child
attorneys (35%) also agreed with that proposition.
C. The Resolution Session
The survey also asked about the respondents’ experiences with the
resolution session. When asked whether the resolution session was a
valuable vehicle to resolve special education disputes quickly, attorneys on
both sides of the table essentially said “No.” Just eight school district
attorneys (6%) strongly agreed with the proposition; another forty-five
school district attorneys (35%) agreed with the proposition. Over one-third
of school district attorneys either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the
proposition, while nearly one-quarter of the school district attorneys
essentially took no position. 302
The parent-child attorneys were even more negative about the use of the
resolution session as a means to resolve disputes. Just five parent-child
attorneys (3%) strongly agreed that the resolution session was a valuable
vehicle to resolve disputes quickly. Another twenty-eight individuals
(15%) agreed with the proposition. However, over sixty percent of the
parent-child attorneys disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition,
while the remainder had no opinion. 303
When asked whether, based on experience, the respondents had
“substantial success” in resolving special education disputes at the
resolution session, the survey respondents generally answered in the
negative. One-half of the school district attorneys indicated that, in their
experience, the resolution session had not resulted in substantial success.304
302

Twenty-eight school district attorneys (22%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the
proposition. Thirty-two school district attorneys (25%) disagreed with the proposition, and
sixteen others (12%) strongly disagreed with the proposition.
303
Forty parent-child attorneys (21%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the
proposition. Fifty-eight parent-child attorneys (30%) disagreed with the proposition and
another sixty individuals (31%) strongly disagreed with the proposition.
304
The question was a Likert-type question that asked the respondents to agree with
the proposition. Just four school district attorneys (3%) strongly agreed with the
proposition. Twenty-seven individuals (21%) agreed with the proposition, and another
thirty-three individuals (26%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposition. Fortyfour school district attorneys (35%) disagreed with the proposition, and an additional
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Two-thirds of the parent-child attorneys indicated that the resolution session
had not been substantially successful in resolving disputes. 305
The results were very similar in response to a question whether the
parties “most often” do not resolve a special education dispute at the
resolution session. Again, over one-half of the school district attorneys
indicated that, in their experience, the parties did not often resolve a special
education dispute during the resolution session. 306 Nearly three-quarters of
the parent-child attorneys indicated that, in their experiences, the resolution
session often did not resolve a special education dispute. 307
Again, the narrative comments of the survey respondents were telling.
One school district attorney stated: “Many school districts do not agree to it
because they see it as an unproductive step which only incurs extra costs for
them.” Another school district attorney stated: “It's a waste of time. We
almost always waive the resolution session and proceed directly to
mediation. The presence of a mediator usually goes a long way toward
helping the parties reach an agreement.” Similarly, a parent-child attorney
stated: “Resolution sessions are ineffective because most often it consists of
the same individuals arguing over the same issues they couldn't resolve at
an IEP meeting. There is no one new involved in the process. It just
unnecessarily delays resolution [of] the matter.”
Parent-child attorneys expressed concerns that school districts use the
resolution session to gain “free discovery” about the other side’s case in
advance of a due process hearing. One parent-child attorney stated: “The
resolution session/period simply causes delays. School District[]s do not use
it to resolve matters, but instead use it as a means of intimidating the parent,
delaying the proceedings, and/or a form of discovery in preparation for the
hearing.” This use of the resolution session as a litigation strategy by
school district was reflected in several comments of parent-child attorneys.
nineteen individuals (15%) strongly disagreed with the proposition.
305
Four parent-child attorneys (2%) strongly agreed with the proposition. Twenty-five
individuals (13%) agreed with the proposition, and another thirty-five individuals (18%)
neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposition. Forty-six parent-child attorneys (24%)
disagreed with the proposition, and an additional eighty parent-child attorneys (42%)
strongly disagreed with the proposition.
306
Eighteen school district attorneys (14%) strongly agreed with the proposition.
Forty-nine individuals (38%) agreed with the proposition, and another twenty-eight
individuals (22%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposition. Twenty-nine school
district attorneys (23%) disagreed with the proposition, and an additional four school
district attorneys (3%) strongly disagreed with the proposition.
307
Seventy-six parent-child attorneys (40%) strongly agreed with the proposition.
Twenty-seven individuals (33%) agreed with the proposition, and another twenty-eight
individuals (15%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposition. Twenty parent-child
attorneys (11%) disagreed with the proposition, and just four individuals (2%) strongly
disagreed with the proposition.
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For example, one individual stated: “In my view, the resolution session
never focuses on resolution of the parents' claims, but instead focuses on the
district's attempt to take discovery and to strengthen its litigation
position.” 308
And at least one school district attorney approached this issue with a
slightly different focus, stating: “From a school attorney's perspective,
voluntary mediation tends to be far more effective if used in that both
parties seem to take comfort in and benefit from the facilitation of a neutral
third-party. If the parties couldn't work out their issues at an IEP meeting or
otherwise, sitting together again at a resolution session is usually not helpful
to resolve the case. It can, however, be useful in creating a record of what a
district tried to do to resolve a case since the documentation is admissible at
a due process hearing (unlike mediation documentation).”
Several survey respondents also noted that the resolution session is
poorly placed in the dispute resolution system to be effective. One survey
respondent stated: “As to an actual resolution session conducted by the
school district, I find them to be lar[]gely unhelpful because there is no
neutral party to help rebuild the trust and open the lines of communication
between the parties, they have low rates of success in my experience, and
simply unnecessarily delay the due process case.” A school district attorney
noted:
Although it has been effective, that is rare. Typically, it
takes formal mediation for true resolution to occur. The
resolution session is usually a rehashing of the issues
included in the due process hearing request. I think it also
occurs too early--if the parents filed for due process, then
they are still really angry and ready to litigate, and the school
is very defensive at having been sued. After a little time
passes and litigation becomes more involved and timeconsuming, the parties are usually ready to resolve it and be
done the whole process. 309

308

Another parent-child attorney similarly commented: “Resolution sessions are used
by school districts to repeat their last offer, try to bully parents, and try to obtain early
discovery of whatever information parent might have to use against them when they don't
settle the case.”
309
Echoing similar thoughts, one parent-child attorney commented: “I think that the
resolution session is generally a waste of time for parents, is confusing for them, because
the school does little of significance to change their position, and the school uses it as free
discovery and to maneuver the parent into a weaker position. As there is no outside actor,
e.g., a mediator, I don't think there is anything about the resolution session that could not
be resolved by the district in direct discussions with the parents at an IEP meeting.”
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Finally, another concern was the complicating factor about payment of
attorneys’ fees for represented parents. One school district attorney stated:
“Often, in the district I represent, the parent's attorneys refuse to allow them
to attend resolution for fear they will settle without addressing attorney's
fees.” A parent-child attorney stated: “It's just another meeting with the
same parties to the disagreement. Unlikely to resolve anything and you
can't get attorney fees.”
D. One-Tier v. Two-Tier Structure.
The survey then inquired about the one-tier and two-tier due process
structures. Seventy-seven survey respondents indicated that they had
experience litigating in a jurisdiction with a two-tier system. 310 Of those
seventy-seven respondents, forty-six (60%) indicated that they would prefer
a one-tier structure over a two-tier structure. Nine respondents (12%) had
no opinion, and twenty-two (29%) indicated that they preferred the two-tier
structure. 311
Using Likert-type questions, the survey posited reasons why a two-tier
administrative structure might or might not be advantageous. The survey
asked whether a two-tier structure was preferable because the second level
of review would issue a decision faster than if the case were directly
appealed to state or federal court. Just one respondent (2%) strongly agreed
with that proposition. An additional thirteen respondents (20%) agreed with
the proposition; however, nearly two-thirds of the respondents either
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition. 312
The survey also asked the respondents whether the second level of
review decreased the likelihood that a party would file suit in federal or
state court. The purpose of the question was to determine the practitioners’
opinions whether a two-tier structure reduced court filings. Not a single
survey respondent strongly agreed with this proposition. Nineteen
respondents (29%) agreed with the proposition. Twenty-six individuals
(40%) disagreed with the proposition that the second level of review would
decrease appeals to state or federal court, and eight individuals (12%)

310

Those jurisdictions are: Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma and South Carolina. North Carolina has a “modified one-tier” system in
which both administrative levels are conducted by the State. See O.M. v. Orange Cnty.
(N.C.) Bd. of Educ., 2013 WL 664900, at *11 (M.D.N.C., Feb. 23, 2013).
311
Because only seventy-seven individuals indicated that they had experience with a
two-tier structure, I did not divide the total into subgroups by client representation.
312
Nine respondents (14%) had no opinion. Twenty-three respondents (35%)
disagreed with the proposition, and nineteen respondents (29%) strongly disagreed with the
proposition.
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strongly disagreed with the proposition. 313 Thus, just over one-half of the
survey respondents indicated that, in their opinion, the second level of
review does not decrease further appeals to state or federal court.
The survey then asked the respondents whether the second level of
review increased the overall costs of IDEA due process. Seventeen survey
respondents (27%) strongly agreed with this proposition and an additional
twenty-three respondents (37%) agreed with the proposition. Just eleven
survey respondents (17%) disagreed with the proposition, and three (5%)
strongly disagreed with the proposition. 314
The survey respondents again were given the opportunity to provide
comments on the issue. Those who supported a two-tier structure indicated
that one advantage of a two-tier structure was the opportunity to correct
errors made at the hearing officer level quickly and inexpensively. For
example, one survey respondent noted: “The impartial hearing officer does
not always apply the law. The two-tier process allows for a review of the
legal issues involved.” Another individual commented: “State-level review
corrects the often hasty and overworked hearing officers, whose decisions
run the gamut in terms of how bad they can be.” Yet another opinion was:
“The second tier really is an appeal but is much less expensive. It gives
clarity to the issues and has helped avoid costly appeals in court.”
Those survey respondents who would rather litigate in a one-tier
structure essentially cited three interrelated reasons to prefer a one-tier
structure: efficiency, expense, and time. Many survey respondents
concisely stated: “speed and simplicity” or “less expense for clients” or
“[f]aster resolutions.” Other comments included: “[T]wo tier systems
require much more manpower, thus a one tier is more efficient for the SEA
and the families.” 315
In addition, several comments reflected the survey respondents’ strong
belief that, for those disputes in which a due process hearing is held, the
case is not over until it had been heard in federal court. Several respondents
made reference to federal court as the final decision maker, stating, for
example: “If the result is unsatisfactory, we would prefer getting that appeal
into the Courts.” Another comment was: “No reason for 2 tier! Get
through administrative process and go straight to court where we want to be
anyway!” Still a third comment was: “I worked in a state with a one-tier
structure and felt like it was helpful. If the parents are intent on getting to
313

Twelve individuals (18%) had no opinion.
Nine individuals (14%) had no opinion.
315
Comments included the following: (a) “A second tier is inefficient, and costly, and
results in additional delays;” (b) “[t]he process is slow and burdensome;” and (c) “[l]ess
costly. The second tier is often a "rubber stamp" of the first level and creates a barrier to
parents getting into court in a timely manner.”
314
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court for their attorney fees no matter what, it gets it done more quickly.”
And a fourth comment: “The first truly neutral forum in special ed is
federal court, and the sooner parties get there the quicker disputes will be
resol[v]ed.”
Some survey respondents also stated a belief that the second level of
review was “political” or that the second level of review was unnecessary
because the second level was simply a “rubber stamp” of the hearing
officer’s decision. 316
Three hundred and four survey respondents indicated that they had
experience litigating in a one-tier structure. One hundred and eight-six
respondents (61%) indicated that they preferred the one-tier structure.
Eighty-eight respondents (29%) had no opinion, and just twenty-nine
respondents (10%) indicated a preference for a two-tier structure.
As with those survey respondents with experience litigating in a two-tier
structure, the reasons for a particular preference were essentially the same.
Those who preferred a two-tier structure cited the ability to get a quicker
review of the first-level decision. One such comment was: “The two-tier
structure provided a faster review of the decision and, in my opinion,
resulted in fewer federal court appeals. Now, it seems that every due
process decision is re-litigated in federal court, which often takes years.”
Similarly, those respondents who preferred a one-tier structure cited issues
of cost and delay. One individual stated: “Efficiency, as it permits the court
to directly review the findings and conclusions of the IHO.” Another
comment was: “Two tier is too lengthy and expensive; would rather head to
court directly.”
Of particular interest were the comments from survey respondents who
had experience in a state that had moved from a two-tier to a one-tier
system. Examples of such comments included:
•

316

“I have litigated under BOTH systems as Arizona used to be a
two tier process. The two tier process simply adds another layer

For example, one respondent stated: “In Nevada the second tier has been a waste of
time. A rubber stamp of the decision.” Another similar comment was: “The SLRO level in
Ohio is not[h]ing more than a rubber stamping of the IHO level. Also, if Ohio were a onetier system with costs borne by the state, filings would likely decrease and/or settlement
would increase.”
The issue of bias or politics was a recurring theme from practitioners with experience
in New York. One representative comment was: “It reduces the machinations of political
manipulation. Here in NYC the Department often appeals (Albany SRO) and the IHO
decision often is reversed, those parents that proceed to federal court often result in the
IHO decision being re-instated at either the District / appellate Circuit level. The politics in
NYS (Albany) are 'intricate' to say the least. A one tier system in NYS would remove a
layer of manipulation (political) often to the detriment of the handicapped child.”
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for district attorneys to bill or for parents to be burdened. I find
that the hearing officer's decisions in Arizona are very thorough
and only one has ever been appealed by the district. When we
used a two tier system, the decisions were not as thorough and
many more were appealed.”
•

“We had a two-tier system in Illinois until 1997 and it was often
utilized, thus prolonging the litigation and final outcome of a
case.”

•

“Disputes are resolved more quickly, and I believe that parents
have a better chance of prevailing in a face to face hearing than
on a cold record. (I practice in Pennsylvania, which used to have
a 2-tier system.)”

•

“Pennsylvania was previously a two-tier jurisdiction which
provided inconsistent decisions among the appellate panels and
costing parents more resources to litigate the issue.”

•

“Virginia used to have a two tiered system and changed to a one
tier. I prefer the one tier as we can get to court more quickly if
we do not settle. When we had a 2-tier system, final resolution
was delayed.”

In addition, there were multiple comments that indicated that, for these
practitioners, disputes almost invariably include an appeal to federal court.
One respondent stated: “It's often better to get the matter to court so that we
can get a resolution.” Another similar comment was: “Being able to go
right to federal court gets us swifter and fairer relief in our cases.” 317 Other
comments reflected the opinion that federal court was the preferred venue
because of the quality of decision making. One comment was: “Because
better decisions are often rendered at the federal court level.” Yet another
survey respondent stated: “The federal court can review the decision of the
hearing officer who actually heard the case, assessed credibility, considered
the factual and legal claims, and then issued the final decision and not
another adjudicator who simply reviewed the transcripts and exhibits. A
second tier system contributes to unnecessary delays. I do not think a
second tier adjudicator is better qualified to determine whether a hearing
317

Another similar comment was: “Because I believe justice is better served when the
parties litigate through the administrative process and then resort to the courts instead of
belaboring the process to the point where it is so expensive and time-consuming that each
side is exhausted before an article 3 judge ever gets to see the case.”

[]

EVERY DAY COUNTS

47

officer was correct or not.” Another similar comment was: “We have a full
opportunity to establish a record and present arguments at the
administrative hearing. I see no reason to include an additional forum
before appeals may be made to court. I do not support any dispute
resolution session that delays decisions for children in special education
matters.”

IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This Part sets forth a series of recommendations with regard to the
structure of IDEA due process. These recommendations do not address
proposals for change within the existing structure, although I do support
several of these intra-system changes. 318 The following recommendations,
however, focus on the structure – the meeting, hearings or procedures that
do, or should, take place in a special education dispute.
A. Offer IEP Facilitation, But Do Not Mandate Its Use
Based on a review of the literature and the survey results, IEP
facilitation appears to be an effective ADR mechanism, particularly if the
parties quickly recognize the need for a neutral third-party’s involvement
early in the process. 319 As a form of ADR that occurs “upstream,” 320 before
either party has filed a due process complaint, IEP facilitation is particularly
helpful in resolving disputes at an early stage. For this reason, any
amendments to IDEA should require every state to develop a program of
IEP facilitation. Since twenty-nine states currently have such a program in
place, with several other states beginning to consider or develop
programs, 321 it seems worthwhile to “nationalize” the practice. Indeed, it is
worth noting that four of the most active jurisdictions for special education
due process filings – California, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York – do
318

In particular, I support Professor Weber’s proposal to ease the exhaustion
requirement and the call for additional low-cost or pro bono legal services for low-income
parents seeking special education services for their children. See Parts II.C.2. and II.C.5.,
supra.
319
See Henderson, supra note 165, at 9-10.
320
Erin R. Archerd, et. al., The Ohio State University Dispute Resolution in Special
Education Symposium Panel, 30 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.. RESOL. 89, 94 (2014); CTR. FOR
APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., Four Exemplary Dispute
Resolution
Systems
in
Special
Education
2
(June
2010)
(noting
(http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Combined%20State%20Profiles.pdf)
that exemplary systems have “early upstream dispute resolution processes”).
321
See Part II.C.1., supra.
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not have a statewide program of IEP facilitation. 322
If Congress does add a requirement that IEP facilitation be available in
all states, Congress also should provide the states with minimum
requirements for IEP facilitation programs. Guidance is necessary to avoid
the “considerable variability” 323 among the states that exists both with
regard to the mechanics of IEP facilitation and “those who serve as
facilitators.” 324
First, the federal government should develop guidelines for the training
of IEP facilitators. While a facilitator should neither judge the parties’
various proposals nor draft an IEP, to effectively facilitate an IEP meeting,
the facilitator must understand the underlying legal and educational issues.
Therefore, facilitators need to understand special education laws including,
at a minimum, IDEA’s LRE requirement, 325 behavioral interventions and
strategies, 326 the use of RTI, 327 IDEA’s discipline provisions, 328 availability
of ESY, 329 availability of related services and transition services, 330 and
compensatory education, 331 among others. Facilitators also should be
familiar with best practices for writing IEPs. Finally, facilitators also need
to understand various teaching methodologies for educating children with
disabilities and the range of education placements for children with
disabilities.
It seems that a good understanding of special education law and
educational methodologies is missing from some current IEP facilitation
training materials. Training materials largely focus on general conflict
resolution skills such as setting ground rules for the parties, effective
communication techniques, dealing with emotional parties and the like.332
322

Id.
See document entitled “IEP Facilitation Background and Context” (available at
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/IEPFacilitationBackgroundContextJobDescripti
on.pdf).
324
Id.
325
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2012).
326
For an in-depth discussion of behavioral interventions, see Elizabeth A. Shaver,
Should the States Ban the Use of Non-Positive Interventions in Special Education? ReExamining Positive Behavior Supports Under the IDEA, ___ STETSON L. REV. __ (2015).
327
20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(6)(B) (2012). For a critical analysis of the use of RTI, see
Colker, supra note 191, at 227-29).
328
20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(E) (2012).
329
34 C.F.R. § 300.106 (2007).
330
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) & (26) & (34) (2012).
331
See note 152, supra.
332
CADRE’s description of current IEP facilitation practices indicates that, while
experience as a “facilitator or mediator is usually required” to be an IEP facilitator, a
“background in special education or knowledge about special education programs or law is
sometimes considered desirable.” CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL
EDUC,
Job
Description:
IEP/IFSP
Facilitator,
available
at
323
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Indeed, that omission might be deliberate, guard against overreach by the
facilitator who otherwise might judge the content of the parties’ proposals
or, even worse, act as an advocate for one party or the other. 333 Whatever
the reasons, it seems that IEP facilitators currently receive only “a
thumbnail familiarity with the IEP environment” as part of their training. 334
Those concerns are valid. However, it seems intuitive – and the
comments of survey respondents confirm – that an effective facilitator
should have a good working knowledge of the substantive topics being
discussed. This is particularly true if one goal of IEP facilitation is to level
the playing field between school officials and unsophisticated parents. 335
The facilitator, while not providing legal advice, should have enough
working knowledge to discern whether the substantive discussion comports
with IDEA’s requirements.
In addition, facilitators need to understand the limits of the IEP
facilitation process. A good facilitator should be able to identify a dispute
that cannot be resolved via IEP facilitation and engage in a frank discussion
with the parties about the limits of the process. An example of such a
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/IEPFacilitationBackgroundContextJobDescripti
on.pdf; see also Presentation by Julie Armbrust, Mediation Northwest, IEP Facilitation:
Tips
of
the
Trade,
at
2
(Oct.
1,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ode.state.or.us/wma/teachlearn/conferencematerials/sped/2010/iepfacilitationtr
aining.pdf (training materials prepared for school administrators in Oregon de-emphasizes
knowledge of the law as a skill in a pyramidal visual where “conflict resolution” and
“facilitation” skills appear at the wider parts of the pyramid and “knowledge of special
education law” at the narrow top of the pyramid); Webinar presented by Trisha BerginLytton, IEP/IFSP Facilitation Techniques for Success (July 10, 2012), available at
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/7.10.12_IEPIFSPFaciltiationTechforSuccessWebinar.pdf (PDF of a PowerPoint presentation of Trisha Bergin-Lytton regarding IEP
facilitation techniques for success addresses mediation and facilitation techniques such as
“consensus-as-you-go” and “counter proposal”); see also The OFFICE FOR DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, IEP FACILITATION BROCHURE, available at
http://odr-pa.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/IEP-Facilitation-Brochure-English.pdf; Presentation by the Conflict
Resolution Ctr. of Baltimore Cnty., Independent IEP Facilitators: What Do They Do?
What’s in it for YOU? (2012), available at http://crcbaltimorecounty.org/newsite/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/CRC-IEP-Presentation-in-pdf2.pdf.
333
Trisha Bergin-Lytton, What an IEP/IFSP Facilitator Is and Is Not (Sept. 2011),
available at http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Facilitator%20Is%20Is%20NotFIEP%20(TBL).pdf; Nicholas R.M. Martin, SUPPORTING THE IEP PROCESS: A
FACILITATOR’S GUIDE 142 (2010) (noting that facilitators may be barred by state
educational agencies from discussing the substantive law).
334
Martin, supra note 333, at 142. This recent text, which is designed to be a
facilitator’s guide, greatly downplays the notion that IEP facilitators should obtain “content
knowledge” regarding IDEA provisions, stating that “being familiar enough with the
terminology to keep up with the discussion is helpful, but not essential, because if the
facilitator is lost, there is a good chance that others are lost as well.” Id.
335
Mueller, supra note 64, at 66.
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dispute might involve an issue regarding a child’s placement, such as when
the parents are seeking a private placement that could be expensive for the
district. In that circumstance, or any others where the parties are entrenched
in their positions, the facilitator should recognize that the dispute likely
cannot be resolved in a facilitated IEP meeting.
A good program of IEP facilitation also should involve oversight.
States should develop materials to gauge the effectiveness of facilitators and
the parties’ satisfaction with the process, including their opinion of the
particular facilitator. With benefit of the parties’ feedback, the facilitator
can further refine his or her facilitation skills or legal background. Another
benefit of oversight is that the states could determine that a particular
individual simply is not an effective IEP facilitator and can remove that
person from the list of available facilitators.
Some states currently do provide an opportunity for participants in a
facilitated IEP meeting to provide feedback about the experience. 336 In
particular, CADRE has collaborated with staff from six educational
agencies, to create an “IEP Facilitation Intensive TA Workgroup,” whose
mission is to “identify[] and develop[] resources, model policies and
procedures relating to IEP facilitation.” 337 This workgroup has made
available documents to evaluate the success of a facilitated IEP meeting
from the perspectives of the parties and the facilitator. 338 If IDEA is
amended to include a program of IEP facilitation, Congress should require
the states to use such evaluative tools to assess the IEP facilitation program
on an ongoing basis.
Finally, IEP facilitation should be a voluntary ADR that the parties may
choose to use; under no circumstances should the parties be required to
engage in IEP facilitation. Specifically, Congress should not adopt the
AASA proposal that IEP facilitation be a mandatory prerequisite to the
filing of a special education due process complaint. 339
There are several reasons to reject mandatory IEP facilitation as a layer
in the due process structure. First, IEP facilitation simply is not an
336

See CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., IEP
Facilitation
Training
Video
Resources
(Mar.
2013),
available
at
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/fieptrainingvideos.cfm.; Presentation by Julie
Armbrust, supra note 332; ALLIANCE/CADRE, Facilitated IEP Meetings: An Emerging
Practice
(Nov.
2004),
available
at
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Facilitated%20IEP%20for%20CADRE%20Engl
ish.pdf.
337
CTR. FOR APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SPECIAL EDUC., IEP Facilitation
Intensive
Workgroup
Page
(last
visited
Feb.
15,
2015),
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/FIEPWorkgroup.cfm.
338
Id.
339
See Part II.C.4, supra.
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appropriate vehicle to resolve every dispute. Some special education
disputes do not involve an issue about the child’s IEP. For example, if a
school district determined that a child was not eligible for special education
services, the district would not proceed to write an IEP. In that
circumstance, a facilitated IEP meeting is nonsensical. Other disputes,
while technically involving the contents of the child’s IEP, also are not
capable of being resolved in a facilitated IEP meeting. When parents have
unilaterally placed their child in private school, the parents cannot obtain
tuition reimbursement in a facilitated IEP meeting. If IEP facilitation
cannot apply to all special education disputes, then it should not be a
prerequisite to the filing of every special education dispute.
In addition, mandating IEP facilitation runs counter to its core
principles. One core principle is the concept of “self-determination, which
is a “voluntary, un-coerced decision in which each party makes free and
informed choices as to process and outcome.” 340 Other core principles are
that open communication and a collaborative environment are keys to
success. 341 If IEP facilitation were mandatory, the parties would not
perceive the process as one in which they have jointly agreed to make their
best effort to resolve a dispute. They would not feel in control of the
process. Rather, mandatory IEP facilitation will be viewed as just another
pre-hearing obstacle.
Indeed, given the goals of IEP facilitation,
“mandating attendance may be the worst method of encouraging
cooperation between the school and parents.” 342
This point is particularly important when one considers the long-term
relationship between parents and their local school district. Voluntary IEP
facilitation can foster a collaborative relationship, improve communication
between the parties, and establish and keep trust that is necessary to serve
the child. Mandatory IEP facilitation will cause all participants, regardless
of their point of view, to perceive the process as something imposed upon
them by an external force – the law – not as a vehicle they choose to repair
or maintain an important relationship.
In that regard, the views of survey respondents are quite telling.
Regardless of client base, a proposal for mandatory IEP facilitation failed to

340

See Model Expectations of IEP Facilitator Conduct, available at
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/exemplar/artifacts/ModelExpectationsIEPFacilitator
sConduct.pdf; see also Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: “The
Problem” in Court-Ordered Mediation, 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 863, 871 n.41 (2008)
(quoting the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators).
341
Mueller, supra note 11, at 63.
342
Andrea Shernberg, Mediation as an Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism for
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 739, 746
(1997) (discussing proposals for mandatory mediation).
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gain widespread support. 343 The survey respondents recognize that IEP
facilitation works because it is a voluntary process in which the parties are
predisposed to reach resolution. The voluntary nature of the process is
critical, and it should not be changed.
B. Eliminate the Resolution Session in Favor of IEP Facilitation
If IDEA is amended to require the states to offer IEP facilitation,
Congress should eliminate the requirement of a resolution session. IEP
facilitation, if done correctly, is a more effective tool to have the parties
meet and discuss their differences productively. If the states offer IEP
facilitation conducted by well-trained facilitators, then the resolution
session, which essentially is an IEP meeting held after a due process
complaint is filed, should not be necessary.
Some might assert that the resolution session should remain in the due
process structure on the theory that it is always beneficial for the parties to
meet and discuss their differences. I disagree. Each layer in the system
causes additional cost and delay. The resolution session in particular causes
delay since it adds an additional thirty days to the time allotted from the
filing of a due process complaint until a hearing officer is required to render
a decision. 344
In addition, the resolution session has not been a “widely used or
particularly effective” vehicle for resolving disputes. 345 In addition, a
review of data collected by OSEP for the 2011-2012 school year indicates
that the resolution session has not been effective. In that time period,
17,118 due process complaints were filed in the United States and other
applicable jurisdictions. 346 Resolution sessions were held in 54% of the
matters; thus in nearly one-half of the disputes, the parties jointly agreed to
waive the resolution session. 347 Of the total due process complaints filed,
343

See Part III.A, supra.
See note 2, supra. I recognize that, in practice, many due process matters are not
resolved within the 75-day window allotted for the resolution session and the hearing. See
Colker, supra note 69, at 396-97 (noting long delays in resolution of due process hearings
in Ohio). The fact that the deadlines may not be adhered to strictly in practice, however, is
no reason to keep an ineffective procedure like the resolution session in the system when it
has a defined time delay.
345
See e.g., Gregory, supra note 253, at 419, n.61 (“In our anecdotal experience, the
resolution session is not a widely used or particularly effective dispute resolution
mechanism in Massachusetts”).
346
Data in includes territories, the Bureau of Indian Education, “outlying areas” and
“freely associating states.”
347
See INVENTORY.DATA.GOV, 2011-2012 IDEA Part B Dispute Resolution,
https://inventory.data.gov/dataset/7c6916d1-c375-4c4c-9de0f2b07aac4fc2/resource/5c23f855-4f83-4173-9a08-6928920dd1a6 (last updated July 3,
344
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just 11.6% of the disputes were settled during the resolution session. 348
In the most active jurisdictions, the resolution session is only marginally
successful in resolving a fair number of disputes. 349 In the nine
jurisdictions with the most due process complaints filed (California, District
of Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
Puerto Rico, and Texas), the highest settlement rate as a result of the
resolution session was Puerto Rico, a jurisdiction that only recently has seen
increased activity in the field of special education disputes. 350 In Puerto
Rico, the resolution sessions resulted in settlements for just under onequarter (25%) of all due process complaints filed. 351 In the District of
Columbia, the settlement rate was 20%. 352
Three jurisdictions,
Pennsylvania, Texas and Illinois, had settlement rates of 15.6%, 12.5% and
10.8% respectively. 353 The remaining four jurisdictions, New York,
Massachusetts, New Jersey and California, had settlement rates of 7.8%,
3.8%, 2.1% and 1.8% respectively. 354 Thus, one-third of the most active
jurisdictions had settlement rates of less than 5%. Over one-half of the
most active jurisdictions had settlement rates of approximately 10% or less.
The data also indicates that practice varies widely by jurisdiction. In
New York, for example, the percentage of due process matters in which a
resolution session was held was quite high. Of the 6,116 due process
complaints filed in New York, a resolution session was held in 5,469
2014).
348

Id.
Id.
350
See Perry A. Zirkel, “Trends in Impartial Hearings under the IDEA: A Follow-up
Analysis,” 303 WEST’S ED. LAW. REP. 1 (2014).
351
In Puerto Rico, there were 1781 due process complaints filed; of those matters, a
resolution session was held in 785 matters, or 44.1% of the total. The resolution session
settled 439 matters, or 55.7% of the matters in which a resolution session was held, or
24.6% of the total filings. See INVENTORY.DATA.GOV, supra note 347.
352
In the District of Columbia, there were 1009 due process complaints filed; of those
matters, a resolution session was held in 773 matters, or 76.6% of the total. The resolution
session settled 208 matters, or 27.0% of the matters in which a resolution session was held
and 20.6% of the total filings. Id.
353
In Pennsylvania, there were 838 due process complaints filed. Resolution sessions
were held 374 matters, or 44.6% of the total. The resolution session settled 131 matters, or
35.0% of the matters in which a resolution session was held and 15.6% of the total filings.
In Texas, there were 359 due process complaints filed. Resolution sessions were held in
142 matters, or 39.6% of the total. The resolution session settled 45 matters, or 31.7% of
the matters in which a resolution session was held and 12.5% of the total filings. In
Illinois, 333 due process complaints were filed. Resolution sessions were held in 94
matters, 28% of the total. The resolution session settled 36 disputes, or 10.8% of the due
process complaints that were filed and 38% of the matters in which a resolution session
was held. Id.
354
Data for these four states is set forth in text and footnotes 359 and 359, infra.
349
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matters, or 89.4% of the total number of complaints. That percentage
greatly exceeded the national average of 54%. Yet, in New York, the
resolution session resulted in a settlement in just 7.8% of the due process
filings, a percentage lower than the national average of 11.6%. Thus, the
parties in New York largely attend the resolution session, but have little
success settling the matter. 355 It may be that New York is one of those
jurisdictions where the resolution session is being used as a litigation
strategy, either as a means to obtain free discovery or create a record for the
due process hearing.
In New Jersey, the resolution session appears to be ineffective for a
different reason. In New Jersey, there were 801 due process complaints
filed in the same time period. Of that total, resolution sessions were held in
just 20 due process matters, or 2.5% of the total number of complaints. In
other words, the parties in New Jersey agreed to waive the resolution
session for 97.5% of the due process filings. Of the 20 matters in which a
resolution session was held, a settlement was reached in 17 matters, or 85%
of the disputes in which a resolution session was held. Thus, in New Jersey,
it appears that the parties largely agree to forego the resolution session – a
sign that practitioners believe it is ineffective – and agree to meet only when
it is highly likely that the dispute can be settled at the resolution session. 356
While this data is just a “snapshot,” it bolsters the opinions articulated
by survey respondents and others 357 that the resolution session is
ineffective. In New York, the resolution session apparently is ineffective to
settle matters even when the session takes place. In New Jersey, the
resolution session is ineffective as an ADR mechanism simply because the
parties largely choose not to attend.
At the time that the resolution session was added to IDEA,
355

The data for California shows a similar trend. In California, 3114 due process
complaints were filed in the 2011-2012 school year. Resolution sessions were held in 457
matters, approximately 14.6% of the total complaints filed. The resolution session resolved
56 disputes – a 1.8% of the total due process complaints filed and just 12.3% of the matters
in which a resolution session was held. See INVENTORY.DATA.GOV, supra note 347.
356
Data from Massachusetts is somewhat similar. In Massachusetts, 582 due process
complaints were filed, but resolution sessions were held in just 48 matters, 8.2% of the total
filings for the period. The resolution session settled 22 disputes, 46% of the total cases in
which a resolution session was held, but just 3.8% of the total filings.
See INVENTORY.DATA.GOV, supra note 347.
357
See Archerd, supra note 320, at 92 (noting that Professor Mark Weber, a panelist,
indicates that mediation is more popular in Illinois than resolution meetings; Professsor
Robert Dinerstein, another panelist, notes that ADR efforts are largely unsuccessful in the
District of Columbia); Id. at 140 (Erin Archerd states: “I was really interested in how
negative a reaction it sounded like most people were having to resolution sessions, which
are a relatively recent innovation under the IDEA2004 authorization. They added in this
resolution session. It sounded pretty universally unpopular on this panel.”).
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commentators and advocacy groups noted a number of concerns. 358 One
concern was that the resolution session was an unnecessarily duplicative
meeting that would take place only after a dispute had ripened between the
parties. 359 Another concern was that the resolution session, with its thirty
day timeline, would delay resolution of a dispute. 360 A third concern was
that the resolution session would be used as a “pressure tactic” by school
districts to pressure parents to settle the matter quickly. 361
While the concerns about duplication and delay remain valid,362
additional concerns have arisen over the years. There is the question
whether the session is used to gain “free discovery” as noted by
practitioners 363 and others. 364 A school district that is not interested in
resolving a dispute nonetheless can compel the parents to meet with school
officials and provide information about “the facts that form the basis of the
[due process] complaint.” 365 An additional concern is that any agreement
reached in the resolution session can be voided in the days following the
meeting. 366 A third concern is that, because the resolution session takes
place after a due process complaint is filed, the parties have the
complicating issue of payment of attorneys’ fees if the parents have retained
358

Demetra Edwards, New Amendments to Resolving Special Education Disputes:
Any New IDEAs? 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 137 147-53 (2005) (detailing the concerns and
objections of various organizations).
359
Id. at 150 (quoting an online petition circulated by the League of Special Education
Voters, which stated the group’s position that, by the type the resolution session is held,
parents “have had countless meetings with the school, making little or no progress.
Families must not be further burdened with extra meetings.”).
360
Id. at 149-50 (quoting an analysis of the statutory amendments published by the
Council for Exceptional Children (CEC), in which the CEC stated that the resolution
session “could deny or delay a parent’s right to a hearing”).
361
Id. at 148.
362
In 2008, CADRE and Project Forum, conducted a survey of special education unit
of state educational agencies. Henderson, supra note 165. The survey responses indicated
a perception that the resolution session adversely affects the timing of dispute resolution,
and that “[p]arties who are seeking a more speedy resolution are likely to waive the
resolution meeting in favor of moving to mediation or a due process hearing immediately.”
Id. at 13.
363
See Part III.C., supra.
364
Henderson, supra note 165, at 13; note 358, supra.
365
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(B)(i)(IV) (2012). Some school districts apparently do believe
that pre-hearing meetings or settlement conferences are an opportunity to “receive
feedback on the merits of their position and then somehow convince the opponent to back
down or even withdraw their hearing request once they have heard how strong the case is
for the other side.” Gregory, supra note 253, at 441.
366
See Comments of Esther Canty-Barnes, The Ohio State University Dispute
Resolution in Special Education Symposium Panel, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 89, 98
(2014) (noting that, in New Jersey, resolution session are “rarely held” perhaps because of
the ability to void any agreements within three days after the meeting).
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counsel. 367
Finally, the resolution session takes place too late in the process to
enable the parties to openly discuss their disagreements and resolve the
matter. By the time the resolution session is held, one party or another – but
most often parents 368 – shifted their focus from negotiation to litigation. 369
In addition, some parents have retained counsel, a complicating factor in
terms of both the litigious nature of the meeting and the payment of
attorneys’ fees.
For these reasons, the resolution session should be scrapped in favor of
a system of IEP facilitation. A facilitated IEP meeting essentially is a
“resolution session” with certain advantages. First, a facilitated IEP
meeting will occur before the dispute has ripened to the point where one
party has filed a due process complaint. Ideally it will take place at an early
stage of the parties’ interactions with one another, before there have been
too many fruitless and contentious meetings. Second, the presence of the
facilitator, if that individual is well-trained, should ensure that the lines of
communication remain open. With an orderly, facilitated IEP meeting, the
parents may be more confident that the school district will conscientiously
implement any agreed-upon IEP.
Third, pre-due process filing of IEP
facilitation will reduce the need to retain counsel and file due process,
thereby eliminating the current issue of payment of attorneys’ fees for work
done by parents’ counsel up to the resolution session.
Finally, eliminating the resolution session also will shorten the timeline
for resolving a filed due process complaint by thirty days. This is an
advantage because allows for a quicker resolution of those disputes that
require an adjudicated decision. Not every special education dispute can be
resolved by informal means, and the use of informal means should not be
allowed to be used to delay a due process hearing when one is necessary to
resolve the matter.
367

Id. at 103 (comments of Professor Dinerstein to the effect that attorneys
representing parents and children in the District of Columbia believe that the District of
Columbia Public School System uses the resolution session to “buy more time” in the
process).
368
Gregory, supra note 253, at 440 (“School districts are most often on the receiving
end of due process hearing requests filed by parents who are dissatisfied with special
education services and/or placements….”).
369
As one practitioner noted: “[O]nce a case moves to mediation or due process, it is
necessarily adversarial at that point and it is difficult to get the parents and the District
"back on the same page" for the remainder of the student's time in the District.” Another
practitioner stated: “Rarely have I had a client come to me that just did not understand what
the District was offering and just could not get his/her views heard due to
misunderstanding. By the time they get to me - a parent attorney - they have given up on
the collaborative process.”
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C. Eliminate the Two-Tier Administrative Structure
Eliminating the option for a two-tier system is another structural change
that would both increase the efficiency of due process and decrease costs.
At the time that the EAHCA was passed, the second level of appeal was
criticized by some as unnecessary. 370 The two-tiered process was justified
on several grounds. First, it was argued that the two-tier system allowed the
state educational agency to enforce the statutory provisions for which it was
responsible. 371 In addition, members of Congress apparently believed that
the “state administrative appeals process … afford[ed] a timely, fair system
for resolving conflicts.” 372 In the view of Congress, this administrative
appeal process actually would reduce “the number of cases going to court,”
thus relieving parents of the “heavy financial burden of going to court.” 373
But perhaps the primary reason for including a two-tier system in the
EAHCA was simply that several states, notably Pennsylvania, had created a
two-tier structure even before passage of the EAHCA. 374 As it had with the
mechanics of due process notice and hearing, Congress copied a structure
that already existed.
A two-tier system, however, clearly increases costs and delay for the
parties. In two-tier jurisdictions, the second level of review could take sixty
to seventy-five days to be completed. 375 In addition to the time delay, the
process is complex and onerous. Take the process in New York as an
example. When a parent appeals a hearing officer’s decision to the second
tier, the parent must prepare and serve a “Notice of Intention to Seek
Review” upon the school district within twenty-five days of the hearing

370

Stafford, supra note 49, at 78.
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Of the seven two-tier states in addition to New York, the time for the second level
of appeal ranges from sixty to seventy-five days. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §115C-109.9
(2006) (appeal to be filed within thirty days of the hearing officer decision; state review to
be completed in thirty days); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-51-05(K)(14)(b)(i) (2014) (appeal
to be filed within forty-five days of the hearing officer decision; state review to be
completed in thirty days); Nev. Adm. Code § 388.315 (appeal to be filed within thirty days,
and state review to be completed thirty days later, although extensions of time may be
_)
granted);
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §91-40-51 (2008) (
(http://www.ksde.org/Portals/0/SES/forms/KSDE_IDEA_Part_B_ProcSafeguardsKansas.p
df); 707 K.A.R. 1:340 (2007) (thirty days to file appeal, with additional thirty days for
)
decision). S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 43-243 (2015) (
(http://www.acs.k12.sc.us/cms/lib3/SC01001719/Centricity/Domain/31/Procedural%20Saf
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officer decision. 376 Not less than ten days later, but within thirty-five days
of the hearing officer’s decision, the parent must prepare and serve a
“Petition for Review” on the school district. 377 The Petition for Review
also must be filed with the Office of State Review of the State Education
Department, along with a copy of the notice described above and proof of
service upon the opposing party. 378 The opposing party then has ten days to
file an answer to the petition. 379 Both the petition and the answer may be up
to twenty pages in length and must conform to certain pleading standards,
including specific requirements for citation to the record. 380 The state level
review officer has thirty days to issue a decision, although extensions of
time may be granted. 381 As part of its review, the State Review Officer
might seek additional evidence or testimony or direct that the parties appear
for oral argument. 382
The comments of the survey respondents make clear that a great
majority of special education disputes (in which a due process hearing is
held0 will not be fully resolved until after the case has been heard in federal
court. If it is truly the practice that the majority of cases will in any event
be filed in federal court, then the second level of review in a two-tier
structure does not serve as a meaningful filter to reduce filings in federal
court. Without that benefit, the second level of review serves only to
increase cost and cause delay.
Perhaps it is the burden and delay that has caused the states to
increasingly prefer a one-tier structure. In 1988, twenty-four states and the
District of Columbia had two-tier systems. 383 Since that time, the states
overwhelmingly have moved from a two-tier system a one-tier system.
Today, just eight states still retain a two-tier system. Pennsylvania, an early
architect of the two-tier structure, moved to a one-tier system in July
2008. 384
376

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 279.2 (2008). The notice is provided to the
school district in order that it can prepare a written transcript of the hearing and forward to
the Office of State Review of the New York State Education Department the transcript, the
hearing officer’s decision, and all exhibits used as evidence in the hearing. Id.
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8 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 279.5. The petition for review and answer
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Indeed, eliminating the second tier would ease the burden on state
educational agencies in two-tier states which, under the current system,
must (a) promulgate rules for procedure, (b) provide parents with
information and forms about the second level, (c) receive and process
appeals that have been filed, and (d) hire, train, and pay second level review
officers. If the second tier were eliminated, those state educational agencies
could shift resources away from managing the second tier to improving the
quality of service provided in the first tier, an improvement in quality that
appears to be needed in some current two-tier jurisdictions. 385 Indeed, the
quality of hearing decisions at the first level of review might improve
greatly if the “backstop” of a second level of review was eliminated.
Eliminating the two-tier structure thus could have multiple benefits both
to the parties in a special education dispute and the state educational
agencies responsible for managing the due process system.
D. Do Not Create Additional Layers in the Structure
I also recommend that no additional ADR proceedings be “layered” into
the due process structure. Additional layers increase cost and delay, reduce
trust in the process, and divert the resources of state agencies. A
streamlined, well-managed system will produce better results than a
fractured, multi-option system.
In particular, the arbitration proposal is an unnecessary addition to due
process. Both arbitration and due process are adjudication models in which
an impartial decision maker determines the merits of the parties’ positions
and, if necessary, a future course of conduct. Thus, arbitration is not a
mechanism that would resolve a category of special education disputes that
could not be resolved in a due process proceeding. The essential
differences between the two forms are (a) the ability to appeal to state or
federal court; and (b) the benefit (offset by the cost) of having the case
385

Colker, supra note 69, at 373 (noting lack of professionalism and poor quality in
IHO decisions in Ohio). The survey yielded comments from practitioners with experience
in New York about lack of timeliness and professionalism with the second level of review
in New York. One such comment was: “[I]n the two tier system in NY, the NYS
Education Department's Office of State Review considers appeals of decisions issued by
impartial hearing officers. They typically have no more experience or expertise than the
impartial hearing officer, yet freely overturn decisions without the benefit of actually
seeing the testimony when making credibility determinations, and they are deemed to have
"superior expertise in the field of education" so the federal courts defer to the decisions of
the state review office - decisions issued by individuals with less experience than most of
the impartial hearing officers, and certainly less than a federal judge. Moreover, the
decisions of the NYS Office of State Review are late - we have cases nearing two years
over due [sic].”
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heard before a three-person panel rather than a single hearing officer. 386
There is little utility in requiring the states to design and maintain two
separate adjudication tracks, particularly if Congress were to streamline due
process by eliminating the second level of review. The volume of due
process hearings generally has been low. 387 In the 2011-2012 school year,
thirty-five states held five or fewer due process hearings. 388 If IDEA
required the states to offer arbitration, those thirty-five states would have
been required to design and maintain two adjudicatory structures to handle a
very small number of disputes.
In addition, the arbitration proposal outlined by Professor Rosenfeld
could adversely affect unrepresented parents. By proposing that no
attorneys be present in the arbitration proceeding, Professor Rosenfeld’s
proposal could seriously tilt the balance of power in favor of school districts
over unrepresented parents. 389 School districts surely will rely on counsel
to prepare for an arbitration even if counsel cannot be present at the
proceeding itself. Over time, school officials also will develop expertise in
conducting arbitrations. Thus, parents who mistakenly believe that the
absence of attorneys somehow levels the playing field will in fact be facing
a very prepared opponent. That scenario exacerbates, not redresses, the
inequities of the current system in terms of the ability of unrepresented
parents to effectively advocate for their child. Those inequities would be
even further exacerbated if unrepresented parents consented to the presence
of the school district’s counsel at the proceeding. 390
This arbitration proposal also could increase the inequities that exist
between those parents who cannot afford attorneys and those parents who
can. Parents who can afford attorneys will not choose arbitration because
they can “purchase” two important items: (a) the benefit of their counsel’s
advice during an adjudicated proceeding, and (b) the right to appeal an
adverse decision. Represented parents will opt for a traditional due process
hearing. Only those parents who cannot afford attorneys will opt for
arbitration, a proceeding that will be presented to them as one that is cheap
and fast. Unrepresented parents thus will severely limit their appeal rights
and appear without representation before a panel vested with “complete
386

I recognize that Professor Rosenfeld’s proposal indicates the arbitration panel
would take a more active role in examining witnesses and reviewing material than a due
process hearing officer would do. Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 560-61. However, at the
end of the proceeding, the arbitration panel functions as a due process hearing officer in
terms of granting relief that would be “final and binding.” Id. at 554.
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discretion” 391 on important topics such as the use and scope of witness
testimony or documents, 392 all the while facing a very prepared opponent.
Finally, the arbitration model almost surely will give rise to collateral
proceedings, particularly on the issue whether unrepresented parents truly
gave knowing and voluntary consent to opt for a proceeding from which
they had no right of appeal. Professor Rosenfeld himself acknowledges that
it will be a “difficult question” 393 to determine whether consent to
arbitration was truly informed and voluntary. That collateral issue itself
could seriously undermine the ability of an arbitration model to bring about
a quick resolution of a dispute.
The AASA proposal for a mandatory IEP consultant is another form of
special education dispute resolution that should not be adopted. First, it
must be noted that the AASA does not propose to add this consultancy
model as an additional dispute resolution mechanism; rather, the AASA
proposes a wholesale replacement of the due process system of which the
consultancy model is one aspect. 394 To the extent, however, that one would
be inclined to pull that piece out of the AASA proposal and add it to IDEA
as an additional ADR mechanism, I recommend against it.
The AASA says that its consultancy proposal is “similar to” a dispute
resolution program available in Massachusetts called the “SpedEx”
program. 395 The differences between SpedEx and the AASA proposal,
however, are huge. The SpedEx program is a voluntary program that the
parties may agree to use or abandon at any time after an IEP has been
rejected by the parents. 396 Parents do not lose any right to proceed with due
process at any point. 397 In addition, the parties are not required to accept
the consultant’s proposal, although the proposal must be implemented if the
parties do accept it. 398 Perhaps most importantly, the Massachusetts
SpedEx program is a little-used “ongoing experimental project.” 399 In the
2013-2014 school year, there was funding for just eight cases. 400
Unlike the voluntary SpedEx program, the AASA proposal would
mandate the use of an IEP consultant. Requiring that the parties implement
a consultant-imposed IEP as a prerequisite to litigation suffers from several
defects. First, not every dispute involves the IEP or issues that can be
391
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addressed by an IEP consultant. Second, given the limited funding
available in Massachusetts for this mechanism, one wonders about the cost
to state educational agencies in hiring and paying private psychologists,
educators or behavior analysts the consultancy fees necessary to implement
this proposal for every special education dispute that involves a child’s IEP.
For these reasons, no such mandatory program should be added to IDEA.
Finally, Congress should resist proposals to add dispute resolution
mechanisms that “eliminate the need for attorneys” 401 or are “lawyerfree.” 402 While it is popular to blame lawyers for a variety of evils, this call
to eliminate them from special education dispute resolution is misguided.
First, school districts almost invariably will have the ability to consult with
their counsel. Parents with financial means also likely will seek legal
counsel and, in most cases, will opt for the dispute resolution mechanism
that allows them to rely on counsel. Thus, encouraging a “lawyer-free
system” 403 only harms the most unsophisticated and least-resourced parents
who really need the help.
More importantly, however, good attorneys can help to resolve disputes
quickly. In the survey, one parent-child attorney commented: “It has been
my experience and the experience of other attorneys in the state, that the
involvement of attorneys increases the probability that the case will be
resolved.” School district attorneys also attest to the value of having
attorneys in the process, as noted by the comment of one survey respondent:
“The resolution sessions in most cases I have handled, when they were
successful at resolving the dispute, had the lawyers in attendance. In my
experience, lawyers for parents will not allow their clients to reach
agreement at a resolution meeting unless and until the lawyer has approved
the agreement (and the agreement includes a provision for payment of the
attorney's fees). It is more efficient if the case is going to get resolved to
have the lawyers attend. That's not how the IDEA was intended to work, in
my view, but it is the practical reality.”
Special education law involves complex legal questions, and the
competent legal representation is anyone involved in the process. To ensure
both equity and efficiency, Congress should not choose a dispute resolution
mechanism that would exclude good advisors from the process.
CONCLUSION
The essential goal of special education dispute resolution is to
resolve the matter quickly so that the child receives the proper education as
401
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soon as possible. To fulfill this goal, structure matters. A fractured system
with multiple avenues and options can cause delay, increase cost, and
reduce trust in the process. A streamlined, well-managed structure will
produce sensible decisions at low cost and without delay, ensuring that, for
the child with a disability, every day of school will count.

